Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 48
Number 1 COVID-19 and Systemic Injustice:
People and Governance

Article 5

2020

The Opening of a Pandora’s Box: How Sports Teams Exploit The
Broad Reading of Kelo to Develop Sports Stadiums
Bruce Racine

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj

Recommended Citation
Bruce Racine, The Opening of a Pandora’s Box: How Sports Teams Exploit The Broad Reading of Kelo to
Develop Sports Stadiums, 48 Fordham Urb. L.J. 143 (2021).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol48/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

THE OPENING OF A PANDORA’S BOX: HOW
SPORTS TEAMS EXPLOIT THE BROAD READING
OF KELO TO DEVELOP SPORTS STADIUMS
Bruce Racine*

Introduction ...............................................................................................144
I. The Evolving Nature of “Public Use” and Eminent Domain .................149
A. History of “Public Use” and Eminent Domain ..........................149
i. Berman v. Parker: The Use of Eminent Domain for
Economic Development Starts ..........................................151
ii. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: The Court Further
Expands “Public Use”........................................................152
iii. Kelo v. City of New London: The Court Opens a
Pandora’s Box....................................................................153
iv. Ramifications of Kelo.........................................................156
II. Eminent Domain Relating to Sports Stadiums and Arenas...................158
A. History of Using Eminent Domain for Sports Stadiums and
Arenas in the United States .....................................................158
B. Rampant Building of Sports Stadiums and Arenas During
the Last Few Decades ..............................................................161
C. Recent Uses of Eminent Domain by Sports Teams and Cities ..164
i. Nationals Park: Eminent Domain in the Nation’s Capital....165
ii. Goldstein v. Pataki: The Nets Move to Brooklyn ...............166
iii. Sacramento Kings: Eminent Domain Usage Spreads to
the West Coast ...................................................................168
iv. Audi Field: Eminent Domain Returns to the District .........170
D. Future Problems of Eminent Domain with Sports Stadiums .....173
E. The Power of Sports in People’s Lives ......................................176
III. Ending Sports Teams’ Exploitation of Kelo for Sports Stadiums .......180

*

J.D., 2021, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2018, Colgate University. Thank
you to Professor Nestor Davidson for guiding me through the Note and subject material.
Thank you as well to the editors and staff of the Fordham Urban Law Journal, particularly
Christina Bai, Kelly Lin, and Nora Stephens for their insight and dedication. Finally, I am
grateful to my family and friends for their support and encouragement.

143

144

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

A. The Supreme Court Could Narrow Kelo ...................................181
B. State Legislatures Stepping In ....................................................185
C. State Courts Narrowing Takings Under State Laws ..................187
D. Eminent Domain and Relocation Contractual Provisions..........190
E. The Public Purpose Doctrine......................................................190
IV. The Solutions That Can Work .............................................................192
Conclusion .................................................................................................195
INTRODUCTION
The Faith Deliverance Temple sits in the middle of downtown Orlando,
Florida, right near the Amway Center, where Orlando’s National
Basketball Association (NBA) team plays.1 The Faith Deliverance Temple
has been serving the Parramore residents in Orlando for over 40 years; the
Temple has been at its current location for almost three decades.2 In 2014,
the City of Orlando approached the church to buy its property through a
voluntary acquisition.3 When the church refused to negotiate with the City
because its roots in the community were too strong, Orlando looked into
other options to acquire land to build a new Major League Soccer (MLS)
stadium for the Orlando City Soccer Club. 4 The City settled on using
eminent domain to obtain the land.5 At first, the City threatened the Faith
Deliverance Temple with eminent domain, but the church still refused to

1. See City of Orlando MLS Stadium: Faith Deliverance Temple (Orange County, FL),
BRIGHAM PROP. RTS. L. FIRM (2016) [hereinafter City of Orlando MLS Stadium],
https://propertyrights.com/project/faith-deliverance-temple/ [https://perma.cc/YNF7-4K85].
2. See id.
3. See Church Fights Back Against City’s Eminent Domain Suit, OWNERS’ COUNS.
AMERICA
(June
11,
2014),
https://www.ownerscounsel.com/church-fights-back-against-citys-eminent-domain-suit/
[https://perma.cc/6H4V-XZBH].
4. See David Damron, Orlando Drops Eminent Domain Action Against Church, Moves
Soccer Stadium Farther West, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Aug. 4, 2014, 6:17 PM),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-orlando-soccer-stadium-church-e
minent-domain-20140804-story.html [https://perma.cc/D5HY-P95V].
5. See Mark Schleub, Judge: Orlando Can Take Land for Soccer Stadium, ORLANDO
SENTINEL
(Jan.
31,
2014),
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/os-xpm-2014-01-31-os-orlando-soccer-stadium-land
-20140131-story.html [https://perma.cc/Q94B-MN4Y]. Eminent domain refers to the
government’s power to take private property and convert it to public use. The Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that the government may only use this option if
it provides just compensation to the property owners. See Eminent Domain, LEGAL INFO.
INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/eminent_domain [https://perma.cc/KVB5-M776]
(last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
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sell their land. 6 Weeks of negotiations over prices eventually faltered,
forcing Orlando to file an eminent domain lawsuit to take the land.7
The City of Orlando was under a tight timeframe to begin constructing
the stadium in time for the 2016 MLS season. 8 The Faith Deliverance
Temple had no intention of moving and decided to play the long game with
city officials, which meant challenging the taking in court.9 In January
2014, Circuit Judge Patricia Doherty ruled that the stadium served a public
purpose and the City had the right to take the land needed for the MLS
stadium.10 Despite this ruling, the church chose to continue challenging the
taking.11 But, by this point in the suit, Orlando’s use of eminent domain to
take property from a small church to build a $100 million stadium became
national news.12 After receiving backlash for their intended actions, City
officials stopped pursuing the church’s land and relocated the stadium one
block from the original plan.13 Today, the Faith Deliverance Temple stands
in the shadow of the Orlando City Soccer Club’s stadium. Orlando’s use of
eminent domain made national news as reporters from ESPN, Forbes, and
The Washington Post wrote articles about the use. 14 Many reporters

6. See Damron, supra note 4.
7. See Schleub, supra note 5.
8. See Damron, supra note 4.
9. See id.
10. See Schleub, supra note 5.
11. See City of Orlando MLS Stadium, supra note 1.
12. See Ilya Somin, Orlando Condemns Private Property in Order to Build a Major
League Soccer Stadium, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2014, 5:23 PM) [hereinafter Somin, Orlando
Condemns],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/02/07/orlando-condem
ns-private-property-in-order-to-build-a-major-league-soccer-stadium/
[https://perma.cc/827P-GTB5].
13. See Damron, supra note 4; IJ Action, Orlando Drops Attempt to Abuse Eminent
Domain,
INST.
FOR
JUST.
(Aug.
6,
2014),
https://ij.org/action-post/orlando-drops-attempt-to-abuse-eminent-domain-replace-church-wi
th-soccer-stadium/ [https://perma.cc/ULD4-PHVQ].
14. See Marc Edelman, Florida Court Allows Taking of Private Land to Build a Major
League Soccer Stadium Based on a Broad Application of “Public Use” Doctrine, FORBES
(Feb.
3,
2014,
1:03
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2014/02/03/florida-court-allows-the-taking-of-c
hurch-land-to-build-a-major-league-soccer-stadium/#74391bb15e64
[https://perma.cc/6P53-WG5D]; Mina Kimes, Stadium Progress Halted by Church, ESPN
(July
7,
2014),
https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/11181941/city-orlando-plans-soccer-stadium-thwarte
d-church-espn-magazine [https://perma.cc/9MP4-CCFF]; Somin, Orlando Condemns, supra
note 12.
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observed that despite Florida having some of the strongest post-Kelo 15
eminent domain reform laws in the country, the judge ruled for the City.16
Throughout the country, cities and local governments compete to build
the next greatest stadium or arena. Land use experts Amirit Kulkarni,
Brenda Aguilar-Guerrero, and David Skinner observed that “[c]ities,
counties and private enterprises throughout the U.S., particularly in
California, are competing to recruit and retain professional sports teams.
The decisive factor in nearly every proposed deal is providing a new
multi-million dollar sports arena.”17 In the past 27 years, there have been
over 122 sports facilities erected in the United States.18 In the last 12 years
alone, the four major sports leagues — the National Football League
(NFL), National Basketball Association (NBA), Major League Baseball
(MLB), and National Hockey League (NHL) — have built 27 stadiums or
arenas.19 These statistics on major stadiums do not include smaller leagues
15. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also discussion infra Section
III.A.
16. See Somin, Orlando Condemns, supra note 12. Florida has some of the strongest
state laws, and its courts initially refused to recognize public purpose in building sports
facilities. See Ilya Somin, The Case Against the Kelo Decision — Part I, WASH. POST (June
1, 2015, 11:10 AM) [hereinafter Somin, The Case Against the Kelo Decision],
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/06/01/why-the-kelo-de
cision-is-wrong-part-i/ [https://perma.cc/3PEA-58B2]; see also Ilya Somin, Justice Stevens
Admits Error in the Kelo Case — But Also Doubles Down on the Bottom Line, REASON
(June 8, 2019, 2:55 PM) [hereinafter Somin, Justice Stevens Admits Error],
https://reason.com/2019/06/08/justice-stevens-admits-error-in-the-kelo-case-but-also-double
s-down-on-the-bottom-line/ [https://perma.cc/YR5H-MBG2]. Yet, recently, the courts have
become more accepting of using eminent domain for sports stadiums. See Edelman, supra
note 14.
17. Amrit Kulkarni, Brenda Aguilar-Guerrero & David Skinner, City of Sacramento
Beats All Challenges to New $477 Million Downtown Sports Arena, MEYERS NAVE,
https://www.meyersnave.com/city-of-sacramento-beats-all-challenges-to-new-477-million-d
owntown-sports-arena/ [https://perma.cc/R9K6-R9HH] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020).
18. See Aaron Gordon, America Has a Stadium Problem, PAC. STANDARD (June 14,
2017),
https://psmag.com/economics/america-has-a-stadium-problem-62665
[https://perma.cc/8MV9-GG58]; Ballpark & Stadium Comparisons, Ballparks of Baseball,
BALLPARKSOFBASEBALL.COM,
https://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/comparisons/
[https://perma.cc/N54J-JWGQ] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); Future Ballparks,
BALLPARKSOFBASEBALL.COM,
https://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/future-ballparks/
[https://perma.cc/324E-P7ZL] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); Future NFL Stadiums, STADIUMS
PRO
FOOTBALL,
https://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/future-stadiums/
[https://perma.cc/NNA8-GALE] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); NBA Arenas — 2019–20’
Season,
HISPANOSNBA,
https://en.hispanosnba.com/nba-arenas
[https://perma.cc/JHL6-TP39] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); NFL Stadiums Comparisons,
STADIUMS
PRO
FOOTBALL,
https://www.stadiumsofprofootball.com/comparisons/
[https://perma.cc/QC9G-FPN5] (last visited Oct. 18, 2020); Zach Spedden, NHL Arenas
Oldest
to
Newest,
ARENA
DIG.
(Oct.
18,
2018),
https://arenadigest.com/2018/10/18/nhl-arenas-oldest-newest/
[https://perma.cc/LZG9-WF9R].
19. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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like MLS, which has constructed, or is in the process of constructing, 12
new facilities.20
The use of eminent domain to build these stadiums or arenas has risen
significantly since the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of
New London.21 Sports team owners see the benefits of building a facility as
close to downtown areas as possible and view eminent domain as a
practical means to achieving that goal.22 Before 2005, sports team owners
rarely used eminent domain to acquire the land on which to build their
facility; by contrast, since 2005, at least eight sports team owners have used
eminent domain to secure land.23 Teams now petition local governments to
use the power of eminent domain, given the Supreme Court’s Kelo
interpretation of the word “public use” in the Takings Clause.24
While other articles have addressed sports team owners’ use of eminent
domain to obtain the land on which to build their sports arenas, this Note
discusses if it is time for a critical reexamination as to whether this is a
proper use of eminent domain.25 Since the Kelo decision, the effects and

20. See Zach Spedden, MLS Stadiums Oldest to Newest: Updated for 2019, SOCCER
STADIUM
DIG.
(Jan.
10,
2019),
https://soccerstadiumdigest.com/2019/01/mls-stadiums-oldest-to-newest-updated-for-2019/
[https://perma.cc/6LPL-E3JN].
21. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
22. See Keith Schneider, Welcome to the Neighborhood: America’s Sports Stadiums Are
Moving
Downtown,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/19/business/sports-arena-development.html
[https://perma.cc/SH9G-W6JR]; Patrick Sisson, Can Stadiums Save Downtowns — And Be
Good
Deals
for
Cities?,
CURBED
(Jan.
30,
2018,
12:33
PM),
https://www.curbed.com/2018/1/30/16948360/stadium-public-funding-sacramento-kings
[https://perma.cc/M5GE-M4XJ]. Sports team owners observe that they only have to pay
“fair market” value for the land, which could make the land cheaper compared to what the
original landowners would want. See, e.g., James Joyner, Eminent Domain Ruling Affects
Dallas
Cowboys
Stadium,
OUTSIDE
BELTWAY
(June
25,
2005),
https://www.outsidethebeltway.com/eminent_domain_ruling_affects_dallas_cowboys_stadi
um/ [https://perma.cc/8YY7-3DBC] (discussing the tough negotiations between the Dallas
Cowboys and landowners, and how the Cowboys tried paying pennies on the dollar for the
land).
23. See IJ Action, Foul Ball: Ten Cities That Used Eminent Domain for Sports
Stadiums, INST. FOR JUST. (Sept. 18, 2015) [hereinafter IJ Action, Foul Ball],
https://ij.org/action-post/foul-ball-ten-cities-that-used-eminent-domain-for-sports-stadiums/
[https://perma.cc/L5GD-3GSV]. The eight stadiums are Mercedes-Benz Stadium, Petco
Park, Golden 1 Center, Nationals Stadium, Global Life Park, AT&T Stadium, Kansas City
Speedway, and Barclays Center. See id. Using eminent domain for sports stadiums is a
recent phenomenon — there are only two examples of eminent domain used by sports team
owners before 2005. More teams will notice the use and explore the possibilities because
using eminent domain initially seems less expensive than privately negotiating with the
original landowners.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
25. See generally Alberto Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain’s Political
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 237 (2006); David Mark, Taking One for
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consequences of the Court’s expansive view of what constitutes an
acceptable “public use” have raised major concerns in many communities.
Invoking eminent domain, local governments are transferring title of
private property from one private entity to another. Eminent domain
remains an attractive option for local governments’ attempts to find new
ways to keep sports teams in their cities and build the next “premier”
stadium or arena. While certain writers have suggested limiting eminent
domain by passing local or state laws that restrict what constitutes an
appropriate public use, this Note maintains that this is not sufficient, as
these laws could pit jurisdictions or states against one another. 26 Other
authors have suggested increasing the amount of compensation paid for the
taken land, but this Note contends that such a proposal does not address the
fundamental question of eminent domain’s constitutionality.27 As detailed
below, the government should not use eminent domain for sports stadiums
or arenas for the primary benefit of sports team owners. This Note argues
the Supreme Court should narrow the current broad holding of Kelo and the
Takings Clause. A narrow interpretation of the Takings Clause would
prohibit governments from caving to the demands of sports team owners to
use eminent domain to construct sports facilities.
Part I of this Note discusses the history of the interpretation of “public
use” in the Fifth Amendment and the government’s use of eminent domain.
Part I further reviews how the Court has interpreted the phrase “public use”
over the decades, leading to an analysis of two major cases — Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff28 and Berman v. Parker29 — that gave rise to
the Kelo decision. After examining those cases, this Note construes the
Kelo decision by dissecting the Court’s broad reading of the Takings
Clause and its ramifications.
Part II reviews the criticism and support of the broad interpretation of
Kelo. Part II also scrutinizes Kelo’s use for building sports stadiums by
determining how sports team owners build sports stadiums at a much
higher rate presently than before. Part II then considers how sports team
owners lobby local governments to utilize eminent domain to acquire the
land they need for new stadiums or arenas. Further, this Part scrutinizes

the Team: The Persistent Abuse of Eminent Domain in Sports Stadium Construction, 5 FIU
L. REV. 781 (2010); Philip Weinberg, Eminent Domain for Private Sports Stadiums: Fair
Ball or Foul?, 35 ENV’T. L. 311 (2005).
26. See Larry Morandi, State Eminent Domain Legislation and Ballot Measures, NAT’L
CONF.
ST.
LEGISLATURES
(Jan.
1,
2012),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/environment-and-natural-resources/eminent-domain-legislati
on-and-ballot-measures.aspx [https://perma.cc/26UP-74WF].
27. See Weinberg, supra note 25.
28. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
29. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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four recent cases of sports team owners using eminent domain to build
sports stadiums or arenas, and their implications for potential future use of
eminent domain for sports stadiums or arenas. Part II, however, also
analyzes the perceived benefits that sports stadiums and arenas provide
cities, and why building new stadiums or arenas can work if done properly.
Lastly, Part II analyzes how sports stadiums and arenas are being built at an
accelerating rate, displaying the need to resolve the overuse, and possible
exploitation, of eminent domain by sports team owners and local
governments.
Part III explores potential solutions to this excessive use of eminent
domain. This Note submits that the Supreme Court should revisit the
issues in Kelo and limit the interpretation of “public purpose” and “public
use” in the Takings Clause. If the Court does not explicitly overrule Kelo,
then the Court should read the Takings Clause to guarantee that local
governments cannot sell or lease to private developers private land taken
through eminent domain, for the benefit of sports team owners. Part III
discusses other approaches that state legislatures and courts can apply to
the extensive reliance on eminent domain, particularly if the Supreme
Court refuses to review Kelo.
Part IV explains which solutions from Part III are feasible. Part IV
presents strengths and weaknesses related to each possible solution and
why some responses are more likely to succeed than others. This Part also
offers the most direct way to curb the exploitation of sports team owners
utilizing eminent domain. Finally, in conclusion, this Note forecasts a
potential case that might rise to the Supreme Court and how the Court
should rule.
I. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF “PUBLIC USE” AND EMINENT DOMAIN
This Section reviews the key Supreme Court cases leading to the Kelo
decision, particularly focusing on how the Court has developed its
interpretation of “public use” in the Takings Clause.
A. History of “Public Use” and Eminent Domain
Private property ownership is one of the most sacred and inviolable
rights in common law and the United States.30 The Founders, wanting to
limit the government’s ability to take private property from the people,
crafted the Takings Clause. At the end of the Fifth Amendment, the

30. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR
BOOKS, 134–35 (1765); see also ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT MERRIAM & RICHARD FRANK,
THE TAKINGS ISSUE: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON LAND USE CONTROL AND ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION (1999).
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Takings Clause states, “nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.” 31 Courts have interpreted the clause and
recognized that the power of eminent domain is a fundamental and
necessary attribute of sovereignty, superior to all private property rights.32
The Fifth Amendment, through the public use requirement, ensures that
this taking power has limits and that the government does not misuse it. In
the nineteenth century, the federal courts ruled that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed them to review takings by state
governments.33
The Court’s interpretation of “public use” and the government’s use of
eminent domain has evolved over the decades. 34 Traditionally, the
government utilized eminent domain to facilitate transportation, supply
water and other public utilities, construct public buildings, and aid in
defense readiness. 35 The government has also used eminent domain for
national parks or infrastructure projects such as federal courthouses or the
Washington, D.C., metro system.36 The government took the vast majority
of these properties for public use, but in the past half-century, the Court’s

31. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
32. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Rosenthal &
Rosenthal, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 771 F.2d 44, 45 (2d Cir. 1985)).
33. See Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (holding that a
taking of private property of one person or corporation without the owner’s consent and for
the private use of another is not due process of law, and thus violates the Fourteenth
Amendment).
34. See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (May 15,
2015),
https://www.justice.gov/enrd/history-federal-use-eminent-domain
[https://perma.cc/MT4Q-N2HX]. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160
U.S. 668 (1896), shaped the Court’s view of the Takings Clause for years. The Court held
that the federal government had the power to condemn property “whenever it is necessary or
appropriate to use the land in the execution of any of the powers granted to it by the
constitution.” Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. at 679. Even though the legislative branch
did not have an absolute right, it could determine what constituted public use, thus, opening
the door to a broader interpretation.
35. See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, supra note 34; see also United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (permitting a government taking for
navigational waters); Sharp v. United States, 191 U.S. 341 (1903) (authorizing a taking for
the production of war materials); United States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., 112 U.S. 645 (1884)
(allowing takings so that cities could provide drinking water); Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S.
367 (1875) (holding that the federal government had the power to appropriate property for
public buildings).
36. See History of the Federal Use of Eminent Domain, supra note 34; see, e.g.,
Gwathmey v. United States, 215 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1954) (concluding that a taking for
NASA’s launch facility constituted a valid eminent domain taking). At the end of the
nineteenth century, the Court began applying the Fifth Amendment to states and embracing
the broader construction of “public use” as public purpose. See Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v.
Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158–64 (1896).
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interpretation has broadened in scope, potentially exposing citizens around
the country to eminent domain abuse.
Since 1954, the Court has expanded its interpretation of “public use,”
setting the stage for the extremely broad reading of Kelo v. City of New
London. The key cases leading up to Kelo are Berman v. Parker and
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.37 In his majority opinion in Kelo,
Justice John Paul Stevens extensively cites these two cases, and the
dissents by Justices Clarence Thomas and Sandra O’Connor do as well.38
This Note aims to address whether these cases truly support an expansive
reading in Kelo.
i. Berman v. Parker: The Use of Eminent Domain for Economic
Development Starts
In 1954, the Court started to expand the meaning of “public use” in the
Fifth Amendment in Berman v. Parker. 39 The Court “upheld a
redevelopment plan targeting a blighted area in Washington, D.C., in which
most of the housing for the area’s 5,000 inhabitants was beyond repair.”40
The plan would entail construction of public facilities on part of the area,
and the lease or sale of the rest of the area to private developers.41 The
owner of one parcel of land challenged the condemnation, pointing out that
his property was not blighted and that creating a “better balanced, more
attractive community” was not a valid public use. 42 The Court
unanimously refused to evaluate this claim in isolation. 43 Instead, the
Court deferred to the legislative and agency judgment and looked at the
condemnation for the redevelopment plan as a whole.44 The Court stated
that “[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. . . . It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as
well as carefully patrolled.” 45 The Court ultimately decided that if the
City’s government believed that the condemnation of property for eminent

37. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229 (1984).
38. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at
505 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
39. Berman, 348 U.S. 26.
40. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 30 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. 26).
41. See Berman, 348 U.S. at 29–33.
42. See id. at 31.
43. See id. at 34.
44. See id. at 33–34.
45. Id. at 33.
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domain was in the best interest of the City, then nothing in the Fifth
Amendment stood in the way.
ii. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff: The Court Further Expands
“Public Use”
Exactly 30 years later, in 1984, the Court further expanded the Takings
Clause in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff.46 In this case, the Court
considered a Hawaii statute that took fee title from lessors and transferred
the property to lessees (for just compensation) to reduce the concentration
of land ownership. 47 The Court unanimously upheld the statute and
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s narrower view. 48 The Court reaffirmed
Berman’s deferential view toward the legislature and held that the state’s
purpose of eliminating the “social and economic evils of a land oligopoly”
qualified as a valid public use.49 The Midkiff Court rejected the view that a
state’s taking of property from private owners and immediate transfer to
other private individuals did not qualify as public use under the Takings
Clause.50 The Court stated, “it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its
mechanics,” that matter when defining the “public use.”51 In doing so, the
Court broadened the meaning of “public use” and “public purpose” and set
the stage for Kelo. The unanimous Courts in both Berman and Midkiff
were deferential to the legislative branch, thus allowing states and local
governments to push the boundaries of what is an acceptable taking under
the Fifth Amendment.
Over 21 years later, the Court had another opportunity to modify the
reading of “public use” in the Takings Clause. 52 At this point, the
established precedent was that “public use” under the Takings Clause could
mean public purpose. 53 Justice Stevens would further expand this
precedent in Kelo.54

46. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
47. See id. at 232–33.
48. See id. at 235.
49. Id. at 241–42.
50. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 482 (2005) (discussing Midkiff and
the Court’s rejection of transfer of property).
51. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
52. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
53. See generally Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229.
54. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 (holding that a city could take private property for the
purpose of economic development because it satisfies the public purpose).
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iii. Kelo v. City of New London: The Court Opens a Pandora’s Box
In Kelo, the City of New London, Connecticut, proposed an economic
plan to develop parcels of land.55 The City specifically targeted the Fort
Trumbull area for economic revitalization. 56
The New London
Development Corporation (NLDC), a private nonprofit entity,57 assisted in
implementing the plan, which included the promise that the pharmaceutical
company Pfizer Inc. would build a $300 million research facility
immediately adjacent to Fort Trumbull. 58 The plan aimed to draw new
business to the area; according to the NLDC, the economic plan would
create jobs, generate tax revenue, and help “build momentum for the
revitalization of downtown New London.”59 Throughout this planning, the
NLDC held a series of neighborhood meetings to inform the public of the
development.60 In May 1999, the NLDC submitted its plans to the state
agencies, which subsequently approved them.61 The City Council initially
approved the NLDC’s development plan in January 2000 and designated
the NLDC as its development agent in charge of implementation.62 At the
same time, the City Council authorized the NLDC to buy or use eminent
domain to acquire the needed land in the Fort Trumbull area.63 The NLDC
obtained over 90 properties through negotiations but failed to acquire some
necessary parcels. 64 Facing this roadblock, the NLDC used eminent
domain to take the rest of the land without the permission of the
landowners.65
In Kelo, nine landowners (petitioners) called the City’s use of eminent
domain improper. 66 The nine petitioners owned 15 properties in Fort

55. See id. at 472.
56. See id. at 473.
57. “[D]evelopment corporations . . . are 501(c)(3) non-profit organizations that are
created to support and revitalize communities, especially those that are impoverished or
struggling.” Rachid Erekaini, What Is a Community Development Corporation?, NACEDA
(Sept.
17,
2014),
https://www.naceda.org/index.php?option=com_dailyplanetblog&view=entry&category=bri
ght-ideas&id=25%3Awhat-is-a-community-development-corporation-&Itemid=171
[https://perma.cc/5FJW-2JP3].
58. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 473.
59. See id. at 473–74.
60. See id. at 473.
61. See id. at 473–74. Various state agencies reviewed the plans. One agency, the Office
of Policy and Management, reviewed the plan and found it consistent with the state and
municipal laws. See id. at 473 n.2.
62. See id. at 473, 475; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-188 (2005).
63. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 475; see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-193 (2005).
64. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 474–75.
65. See id. at 475.
66. See id.
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Trumbull, with four in Parcel 3 and 11 in Parcel 4A of the development
plan.67 Each property varied as the owner or a family member occupied ten
of the parcels, and outside investors owned and rented out five of the
properties.68 One petitioner, Susette Kelo, had lived in Fort Trumbull since
1997, while another petitioner, Wilhelmina Dery, still lived in the Fort
Trumbull house in which she was born in 1918.69 Mrs. Dery’s husband,
Charles (also a petitioner), moved in when the two were married, which
was over 60 years before the Kelo decision.70 The NLDC did not allege
that any of the properties were blighted or in poor condition.71 Rather, the
Government condemned the petitioners’ properties only because they were
located in the development area.72
The petitioners believed that this taking of their properties violated the
public use restriction in the Fifth Amendment. They appealed the adverse
decisions of the Connecticut Superior Court and the Supreme Court of
Connecticut to the United States Supreme Court.73 The petitioners argued
that the Connecticut state courts incorrectly equated “public use” with
public benefits, such as taxes and jobs, that might flow from private
business enterprises. 74 Traditionally, governments used eminent domain
for roads or public buildings, yet in the petitioners’ situation, none of those
reasons applied.75 In the petitioners’ case, private property was taken for
private use — more specifically, for a private economic development plan
that might not even materialize.76 The petitioners argued that if all a local
government had to establish for a land taking to constitute public use was
to list the development’s expected tax revenue and job growth, then
governments could use eminent domain for practically any private use or
business.77 As the petitioners stated in their argument, “[b]y encouraging a
vision of eminent domain where virtually any property can be taken for
virtually any private business, the majority opinion [of the Connecticut
Supreme Court] invites abuse by governmental bodies and private
parties.” 78 Therefore, the petitioners wanted the Court to declare this
taking improper under the Fifth Amendment and adopt a new bright-line

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 476.
See Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kelo, 545 U.S. 469 (No. 04-108).
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 15.
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rule that economic development does not qualify as public use.79 Further,
the petitioners asserted that if the Court generally allowed eminent domain
for economic development purposes, then there should be reasonable
certainty that the economic project would yield public benefits to justify the
condemnation. 80 Otherwise, the affirmance of the Connecticut Supreme
Court’s decision would “open the floodgates.”81
Five of the Supreme Court Justices rejected the petitioners’ arguments
on the public use language of the Fifth Amendment. Writing for the
majority, Justice Stevens concluded that because the “plan unquestionably
serve[d] a public purpose, the takings challenged here satisf[ied] the public
use requirement of the Fifth Amendment.”82 Justice Stevens also wrote
that “[p]romoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted
function of government . . . [and] there is no basis for exempting economic
development from our traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose.”83 Despite the petitioners’ contention that allowing a municipality
to use eminent domain as part of an economic development plan would
blur the boundary between public and private takings, the Court decided to
defer to the legislature. 84 The Court held that economic development
qualified as a valid public use under the Fifth Amendment and that an
economic development plan like the one in Kelo furthered a public use
because it was for a public purpose.85 The Court has not addressed the
public use language in the Fifth Amendment since Kelo.
The dissents from Justices Thomas and O’Connor warned the majority
of the consequences of such a broad reading.86 Justice Thomas wrote that
the holding established a “far-reaching and dangerous result.” 87 Justice
O’Connor further stated that under the majority’s view, “the sovereign may
take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over
for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to
generate some secondary benefit for the public — such as increased tax

79. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
80. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 74, at 36.
81. See id. at 48–49.
82. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484.
83. Id. at 484–85.
84. See id. at 488–89. “Once the question of the public purpose has been decided, the
amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular tract to
complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch.” Id. at 489
(quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35–36 (1954)).
85. See id. at 489–90.
86. See id. at 493–505 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 523 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.” 88 Kelo gave the
proverbial “green light” to local and state governments to expand their
meaning of “public use” to fit broad, economic development goals.
iv. Ramifications of Kelo
The Court’s decision in Kelo allows local and state governments to use
the new interpretation of the Takings Clause to develop private land. At
first, many states adopted laws that raised the floor for what constituted
public purpose. 89 The Kelo opinion received significant criticism from
legal scholars and politicians who argued that the decision could lead to
abuse from local governments and private developers.90 The criticism and
dissents of Kelo theorized that local governments would misuse the Kelo
decision and extend their applications of Kelo further than the original

88. Id. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). But see id. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting),
for Justice O’Connor’s language (“[T]he sovereign may transfer private property to private
parties, often common carriers, who make the property available for the public’s use — such
as with a railroad, a public utility, or a stadium. See, e.g., National Railroad Passenger
Corporation v. Boston & Maine Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 118 L. Ed. 2d 52, 112 S. Ct. 1394
(1992); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power Co., 240 U.S.
30, 60 L. Ed. 507, 36 S. Ct. 234 (1916)”). The first case involves Amtrak, a private,
for-profit corporation created by Congress, and the second case concerns a power company
incorporated under the laws of the state of Maine to manufacture, supply, and sell power to
the public. Justice O’Connor provided no case citation for her inclusion of “stadium” in this
list. One could argue that, to be consistent with the concept of a common carrier or public
utility, the suggested stadium would be more likely controlled by a publicly financed
organization, such as a public university, and not by a private interest without a communal
public purpose.
89. See Morandi, supra note 26. Generally, the eminent domain statutes or requirements
fall into five categories: (1) prohibiting using eminent domain to develop the economy,
generate tax revenue, increase employment, or transfer private property to another private
entity; (2) defining what constitutes “public use” to be the possession, occupation, or
enjoyment of the property by the public at large, public agencies, or public utilities; (3)
restricting eminent domain to blighted properties and redefining what constitutes “blighted”
to emphasize detriment to public health or safety; (4) requiring greater public notice, more
public hearings, negotiation in good faith with landowners, and approval by elected
governing bodies; and (5) requiring compensation greater than fair market value where the
property condemned is the principal residence. See id. For example, Florida prohibits the
transfer of private property acquired through eminent domain to another private entity
unless its use meets certain exceptions. Florida also mandates a three-fifths vote of both
houses of the state legislature to use eminent domain to transfer private property to another
private entity. Some states, such as New Hampshire and New Mexico, prohibit the use of
eminent domain to transfer private property to another private entity for private
development or even prohibit eminent domain for redevelopment projects. At the same time,
other states such as West Virginia and Alabama provide exceptions to the use of eminent
domain, including the blight exception. See id.
90. See Somin, The Case Against the Kelo Decision, supra note 16; see also Somin,
Justice Stevens Admits Error, supra note 16.
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decision intended.91 In particular, the Kelo dissents emphasized that there
was no legal precedent for the position that economic development
constituted public purpose under the Fifth Amendment.92 Essentially, the
majority’s holding permitted local governments to attach the words
“economic development” to a plan to justify taking private land and ceding
it to a private entity or person. If such a taking were in furtherance of an
alleged public purpose, then the taking would be considered
constitutional.93
Some courts and state governments attempted to prevent the abuse of
using eminent domain for economic development by stating that for an area
to be eligible for taking by eminent domain, the area must be considered
blighted. 94 Experience shows, however, that local governments could
easily circumvent that requirement. States differ as to what constitutes a
blighted area, with some establishing a very low threshold.95 Furthermore,
the definition of “blight” is too obscure or far-reaching to limit misuse by
local governments because these municipalities could deem areas as
“blighted” and then seize private properties in those areas.96 Such vague

91. See Somin, Justice Stevens Admits Error, supra note 16.
92. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
93. Based on Kelo, essentially any taking that provides any benefit to the public would
constitute a valid taking. See Kelo, 545 U.S. 469.
94. See generally Morandi, supra note 26.
95. See id. Wisconsin “[p]rohibits the use of eminent domain to condemn non-blighted
properties to be transferred to another private entity.” Id. Yet Wisconsin state law defines
“blight” to include properties that have detrimental effects on public health and safety; this
potentially opens the door for private developers to use this broad definition to support an
eminent domain taking. See id. Florida, on the other hand, limits how developers and local
officials can condemn certain property as blight. Florida’s statute specifies that a
“[b]lighted area” means an area in which there are a substantial number of
deteriorated or deteriorating structures; in which conditions, as indicated by
government-maintained statistics or other studies, endanger life or property or are
leading to economic distress; and in which two or more of the following factors
are present . . . .
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.340(8) (West 2007).
96. See generally Morandi, supra note 26. For example, Minnesota’s statute does not
contain any limitations on the property selection factors in its language. The statute defines
a “blighted area” as
any area with buildings or improvements which, by reason of dilapidation,
obsolescence, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation,
light, and sanitary facilities, excessive land coverage, deleterious land use, or
obsolete layout, or any combination of these or other factors, are detrimental to
the safety, health, morals, or welfare of the community.
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definitions allow local governments to use eminent domain to exploit
low-income, marginalized occupants.
Often, these low-income
communities have few, if any, resources to challenge the government’s
determination that their areas are blighted.97 Kelo erected a huge barrier to
property owners challenging such takings when it established the precedent
that economic development was a constitutionally permissible reason for
the taking of private property.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN RELATING TO SPORTS STADIUMS AND ARENAS
Part II focuses on the Kelo decision’s impact on the use of eminent
domain to build new stadiums or arenas for sports team owners. This Part
provides specific examples of such use to construct sports facilities in
Washington, D.C.; Brooklyn, New York; and Sacramento, California.
A. History of Using Eminent Domain for Sports Stadiums and Arenas
in the United States
Since Kelo, state and local governments around the country have pushed
the boundaries of what constitutes public purpose and use under the Fifth
Amendment. The governments — perhaps believing that courts would
uphold very few challenges to its interpretation of the Fifth Amendment
language — have looked beyond economic development for their basis, to
see what other land-taking justifications the courts would allow. After the
broad Kelo decision in 2005 determined what constitutes public use,
governments have frequently used eminent domain for building new sports
stadiums and arenas.98 Sports team owners realized the eminent domain
option could be less expensive than private negotiations.99 Before Kelo, it

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.002 (West 2007); see also ROBINSON & COLE, NAT’L ASS’N
REALTORS, URBAN BLIGHT: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE BLIGHT STATUTES AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS
FOR
EMINENT
DOMAIN
REFORM
9–10
(2007),
https://www.nar.realtor/smart_growth.nsf/docfiles/blight_study_revised.pdf/$FILE/blight_st
udy_revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU8C-5GA8].
97. See generally Martin Gold & Lynne Sagalyn, The Use and Abuse of Blight in
Eminent Domain, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1119 (2011).
98. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
99. In private negotiations, sports team owners offer a price to the owners for the land.
The landowners then can accept the original offer, reject it, or make a counteroffer. The
negotiations can get out of hand, as the sports team owners might lowball the landowners,
while the landowners might ask for an exorbitant price because of their emotional
attachment to the land. Sports team owners, presently, can use eminent domain if the
negotiations fall apart, which may give them more leverage to offer a lower price for the
parcel of land. See Alex Hornday, Note, Imminently Eminent: A Game Theoretic Analysis of
Takings Since Kelo v. City of London, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV 1619, 1621–22 (2007);
Richard Bilbao, Breaking: Soccer Stadium Land Talks Stall; City Considers Eminent
BUS.
J.
(Sept.
16,
2013,
10:51
AM),
Domain,
ORLANDO
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was more challenging for states and cities to use eminent domain to take
private property for such facilities, as the test for the use of eminent domain
was narrower and more difficult to satisfy.
Two pre-Kelo examples of cities successfully using eminent domain to
build sports facilities include Pittsburgh in the 1950s and Los Angeles in
the 1960s.100 The City of Pittsburgh decided to build a new arena in one of
Pittsburgh’s most historic neighborhoods. 101 The Urban Development
Authority designated the area as blighted, and the City then stated that the
takings were for economic development.102 The City seized hundreds of
properties to construct a new arena for the NHL’s Pittsburgh Penguins,
resulting in the removal of several thousand people.103 The Los Angeles
Dodgers built its current baseball stadium in Chavez Ravine from 1957
until its opening on April 10, 1962.104 Los Angeles first planned to take the
land and use it for public housing, but after taking the land, the City
government decided, instead, to use the land to construct the current
stadium.105 The ensuing conflict became known as the “Battle for Chavez
Ravine.”106 Generations of families, most of them Mexican American, had

https://www.bizjournals.com/orlando/blog/2013/09/soccer-stadium-land-talks-stall-city.html
[https://perma.cc/RP85-ATHB]; Craig Lucie, Eminent Domain Could Be Used to Build
Falcons
Stadium,
WSB-TV
(Sept.
25,
2013,
7:33
PM),
https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/eminent-domain-could-be-used-buildstadium/242917006/ [https://perma.cc/XYS3-UWZB].
100. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
101. See id. The neighborhood was called the Lower Hill District, which was the cultural
center of Black life in Pittsburgh. See generally JOE TROTTER & JARED DAY, RACE AND
RENAISSANCE: AFRICAN AMERICANS IN PITTSBURGH SINCE WORLD WAR II (2010).
102. See id. The Urban Development Authority is the City of Pittsburgh’s economic
development agency, which supports the City’s economic development goals. See Who We
Are, URB. REDEVELOPMENT AUTH. PITTSBURGH, https://www.ura.org/pages/who-we-are
[https://perma.cc/74S5-SF4E] (last visited Oct. 5, 2020).
103. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
104. See Matthew Savare, John Middleton, Jr. & Scott Walker, Stadia Mania: The
Business, Civic and Legal Issues of New Stadium Construction — Part I, CORP. COUNS.
BUS.
J.
(Feb.
1,
2008),
https://ccbjournal.com/articles/stadia-mania-business-civic-and-legal-issues-new-stadium-co
nstruction-part-i [https://perma.cc/ME6V-BFE8]; see also Scott Harrison, From the
Archives: First Game Played in Dodger Stadium, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017, 1:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/visuals/photography/la-me-fw-archives-first-game-played-in-dodg
er-stadium-20170330-story.html [https://perma.cc/926H-6DB8].
105. See Nathan Masters, Chavez Ravine: Community to Controversial Real Estate,
KCET
(Sept.
13,
2012),
https://www.kcet.org/shows/lost-la/chavez-ravine-community-to-controversial-real-estate
[https://perma.cc/VGT8-L7VX].
106. See Jerald Podair, How the Dodger Baseball Stadium Shaped LA — And Revealed
Its
Divisions,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
12,
2017,
2:30
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/apr/12/dodger-baseball-stadium-shaped-la-and-rev
ealed-its-divisions [https://perma.cc/J69Y-Q3PS].
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lived in the area.107 Yet, government officials labeled the land “blighted”
and began plans to redevelop it.108 The ensuing decade-long fight for the
land caused much hardship for the families, and eventually a referendum
approved the trade of 352 acres of the land to Brooklyn Dodgers’ owner
Walter O’Malley.109 The Dodgers, then in Brooklyn, New York, moved to
Los Angeles, California, once the City built the new stadium.110
The trend of using eminent domain to seize property and build sports
stadiums extended into the 1990s and 2000s in Arlington, Texas, and
Kansas City, Missouri. 111 The City of Arlington, Texas, used eminent
domain to acquire 13 acres for the Texas Rangers’ ballpark in 1991.112 The
Texas Rangers’ officials successfully lobbied the local government to use
eminent domain to acquire the land needed for the baseball stadium. 113
One of the prominent investors, George W. Bush, converted his small
initial investment into a multimillion-dollar profit when the ownership of
the team changed hands.114 In 2001, Kansas City opened up the Kansas
City Speedway; before construction, the City took property from 165
owners who argued that the National Association for Stock Car Auto
Racing (NASCAR) would reap the benefits of this taking and not the
City.115
While cities used eminent domain to build sports facilities before the
Court’s Kelo decision, the use of this strategy has exploded in recent years.
In the years following Kelo, at least eight local governments have used

107. See Elina Shatkin, The Ugly, Violent Clearing of Chavez Ravine Before It Was
Home
to
the
Dodgers,
LAIST
(Oct.
17,
2018,
12:00
PM),
https://laist.com/2018/10/17/dodger_stadium_chavez_ravine_battle.php
[https://perma.cc/PP3T-BV54].
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
112. See id.
113. See Ilya Somin, The Bush Family and Eminent Domain, WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016,
3:07
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/08/the-bush-familyand-eminent-domain/ [https://perma.cc/8XQ9-RLKL]. George W. Bush, prior to becoming
President of the United States, and his partners with the Rangers convinced Arlington
officials to use the government’s power of eminent domain in their favor. They convinced
the Arlington officials to condemn land the Rangers could not, or did not, want to buy on
the open market and to give the Rangers control over the area surrounding the stadium. This
allowed the Rangers to buy the stadium (which cost $191 million to build) for just $60
million. See Robert Bryce, What Price Baseball? The Rangers Ain’t Gonna Like This, Yogi,
AUSTIN
CHRON.
(June
20,
1997),
https://www.austinchronicle.com/news/1997-06-20/529131/ [https://perma.cc/UEH2-9R79].
114. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23; see also Bryce, supra note 113.
115. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
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eminent domain to acquire land desired by sports team owners for new
sports facilities.116 Typically, sports team owners and local governments
advocate for a new stadium by claiming the new stadium will create
economic development in the city.117 Proponents also argue the takings
constitute part of an economic development plan to justify allowing local
governments to utilize eminent domain and obtain the land. This method is
usually cheaper, quicker, and easier for government to acquire the land than
negotiating privately with individual landowners because it eliminates the
holdout problem and forces landowners to accept for their land the “just
compensation” that the Fifth Amendment requires.118
Courts in the United States have largely adopted these arguments
because of the broad reading of the Takings Clause in Kelo. Given the
current interpretation that “public purpose” means public use under the
Fifth Amendment, building a new sports arena serves that broad public
purpose, even if most of the public cannot use it.
B. Rampant Building of Sports Stadiums and Arenas During the Last
Few Decades
Sports team owners around the country are building new stadiums and
arenas at a rapid rate.119 In the last 27 years, cities in the United States
have built around 122 stadiums and arenas, as more sports team owners
wanted to replace their old stadiums with new ones containing various
fan-pleasing amenities and revenue-generating extras such as luxury
suites.120 A number of sports team owners have proposed new stadiums,
which necessarily need land.121

116. See id.
117. See Savare, Middleton Jr. & Walker, supra note 104. Sports owners and politicians
consistently use this argument by stating that the new stadium will provide new jobs in the
stadium and in the restaurants and shops that open near the stadium.
118. Typically, a local government reaches out to landowners to negotiate for the
property. Some will accept the offers, while others refuse to part with their property. This
scenario creates a holdout problem. Those who refuse to accept the government’s offer
might do so for a variety of reasons; some hold sentimental values of their property, while
others just want more money. The holdouts could increase the cost of the stadium and delay
construction. See, e.g., Joyner, supra note 22.
119. In the last 12 years, teams in the four major sports leagues built 27 new stadiums.
MLS has built or is building 12 stadiums, and many colleges likewise are constructing new
sports facilities. See supra Part I.
120. See David Broughton, Venues Change with the Times, SPORTS BUS. J. (Apr. 30,
2018),
https://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2018/04/30/Facilities/Venue-trends.asp
x [https://perma.cc/L5HW-WBJP] (describing some of the new amenities in sports
stadiums); supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Schneider, supra note 22.
121. See Schneider, supra note 22; see also Andrew Zimbalist & Roger G. Noll, Sports,
Jobs, & Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the Cost?, BROOKINGS (June 1, 1997),
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Sports team owners know politicians do not want to be associated with
why a sports team leaves a city.122 The negative press and the disapproving
reactions from voters make it very unpopular for a sports team to move.123
The pressure from the media and voters to guarantee that a team stays in
the city allows sports team owners to take advantage of local politicians.
Sports team owners can threaten to leave, and many do so, unless the city
helps them build a new stadium or arena.124 Government officials often
give franchise owners tax breaks or stadium subsidies to build the newest
stadium — thereby avoiding the team’s relocation.125 Local governments’
use of eminent domain is unpopular because of the hardships created, but
losing a team may be more detrimental to a politician’s reputation.126
The ideal stadium location is now as close to downtown areas as
possible 127 because it provides convenient transportation options for

https://www.brookings.edu/articles/sports-jobs-taxes-are-new-stadiums-worth-the-cost/
[https://perma.cc/3QTT-LZT4]. One can question whether the COVID-19 pandemic will
lessen this push for new sports facilities as the four major sports have significantly limited
fan attendance at their games. As most stadium and arena construction take years to plan
and build, one can expect that such need for new facilities will not significantly diminish as
the sports team owners look past the pandemic to new facilities that please fans and generate
revenue. Plus, the pandemic experience might require building new facilities to
accommodate fans by providing a healthier environment to minimize concerns of disease
spread while still permitting fan attendance.
122. See generally Jim Brunner & Sharon Pian Chan, Sonics Moving to Oklahoma City,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(July
3,
2008,
12:00
A.M.),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/sonics-moving-to-oklahoma-city/
[https://perma.cc/6GRX-DLU3]; Gordon, supra note 18; Joe Nocera, In Losing the Rams,
St.
Louis
Wins,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
15,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/16/sports/football/st-louis-should-be-glad-it-lost-the-ram
s.html [https://perma.cc/N2HX-F393]; Brent Schrotenboer, This Super Bowl Stinks in St.
Louis, Still Burdened by Rams Dome Debt, USA TODAY (Jan. 29, 2019, 3:56 PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/2019/01/29/super-bowl-st-louis-still-picking-up-piec
es-rams-saga/2708034002/ [https://perma.cc/Q8TB-QFYM].
123. See Brunner & Chan, supra note 122; see also Gordon, supra note 18.
124. For instance, owners in the NFL have tried to hold their cities hostage to convince
city administrations to build new stadiums. When the government officials did not budge,
the teams stayed true to their word and left. The NFL’s St. Louis Rams warned that the team
would leave St. Louis if it did not receive a new stadium, and subsequently moved to Los
Angeles. See Nocera, supra note 122. Also, in the NBA, the Seattle Supersonics left Seattle
to move to Oklahoma City for the same reason. See Brunner & Chan, supra note 122.
125. See Savare, Middleton Jr. & Walker, supra note 104. A recent example of this
occurred in Sacramento with the NBA’s Sacramento Kings. It threatened to leave before the
City succumbed to the pressure of losing a sports franchise. See infra Section II.C.iii.
126. People are often forced to move from homes they have lived in for decades. See
Brunner & Chan, supra note 122; see also Gordon, supra note 18. Still, losing a sports team
can be devastating for local politicians because of the personal attachment many citizens
feel towards the team. See infra Section II.E.
127. See Schneider, supra note 22.
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fans.128 Sports team owners often buy not only the downtown land for the
stadium or arena, but also the land surrounding the facility to build stores
and restaurants. 129 Sports team owners, therefore, can propose a
comprehensive economic development argument for obtaining this land
because it brings jobs, business, and tax revenue to the cities. 130 The
economic development arguments and the stadium, packaged together,
make it easier for the government to justify using eminent domain to the
courts and press.
The data does not establish,131 and economists have yet to determine,
whether building a new stadium brings significant economic change and
benefits to the city. 132 For every success like Nationals Park in
Washington, D.C., there is a Miami Marlins baseball stadium in Miami,
Florida, with years of low attendance.133 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
in Kelo held that the City does not need to actually receive the expected
public benefit. 134 Indeed, in Kelo, Pfizer never built its pharmaceutical
plant, and the economic development never materialized in New
London.135 Therefore, the sports team owners have significant leeway to
push their plans through state and local governments. Without much

128. See id. Older stadiums and arenas were usually built further away from the city to
provide less expensive parking. See id.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See generally Ted Gayer, Austin J. Drukker & Alexander K. Gold, Tax-Exempt
Municipal Bonds and the Financing of Professional Sports Stadiums, ECON. STUD.
BROOKINGS (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal
Bonds],
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/gayerdrukkergold_stadiumsubsidie
s_090816.pdf [https://perma.cc/2V8T-BHCV].
132. See Eric Bull, Top 10 Biggest Federal Subsidies for Pro Stadiums (Hint: The
Yankees
Are
#1),
BROOKINGS
(Sept.
9,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2016/09/09/top-10-biggest-federal-subsidie
s-for-pro-stadiums-hint-the-yankees-are-1/ [https://perma.cc/Z3GS-UP3D]; see also
Alexander K. Gold, Austin J. Drukker & Ted Gayer, Why the Federal Government Should
Stop Spending Billions on Private Sports Stadiums, BROOKINGS (Sept. 8, 2016) [hereinafter,
Gold,
Drukker
&
Gayer,
Federal
Government
Spending],
https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-the-federal-government-should-stop-spending-bill
ions-on-private-sports-stadiums/ [https:/perma.cc/X4U5-LCTK]. See generally Gayer,
Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note 131.
133. See Maury Brown, No, It’s Not Too Early to Talk About the Historically Bad
Attendance of the Miami Marlins, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2019, 8:00 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/maurybrown/2019/04/04/no-its-not-too-early-to-talk-about-the
-historically-bad-attendance-of-the-miami-marlins/#3313ecd17b64
[https://perma.cc/H2QJ-K59G].
134. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487 (2005).
135. See Patrick McGeehan, Pfizer to Leave City That Won Land-Use Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov.
12,
2009),
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/nyregion/13pfizer.html
[https://perma.cc/T2RT-GKQV].
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difficulty, a city can label a new stadium as an economic development
project that would improve its landscape.
The dissents in Kelo highlighted the concern that those most impacted
by the Supreme Court’s decision are the ones who cannot effectively
combat it. 136 Sports team owners often choose to develop arguably
“blighted” areas because the land is less expensive, and it is easier to use
eminent domain, if necessary, to acquire the land and bypass holdouts.
Before Kelo, the courts could restrict at least some takings by the
government when it went too far in using eminent domain.137 Kelo, by
contrast, compounded the issue and essentially enabled the government to
take any private land for so-called public use.138
Governments and cities can readily label future projects as urban
developments or renewal programs to pass the test set out in Kelo. The
reading of the public purpose language in Kelo is broad enough that courts
can give any economically beneficial goal significant weight, even if the
potential losses fall disproportionately on low-income communities. The
people in these communities lose their homes and receive no compensation
for the subjective value of their displaced land.139 In her dissent, Justice
O’Connor criticized the majority’s view in Kelo: “[T]he sovereign may
take private property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over
for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is predicted to
generate some secondary benefit for the public — such as increased tax
revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.” 140 The majority’s
interpretation of “public use” does not effectively constrain any takings;
instead, it allows the government to take private property, at any time, and
upgrade it any way it sees fit, including by building a sports stadium or
arena.
C. Recent Uses of Eminent Domain by Sports Teams and Cities
Eminent domain remains an attractive option for city officials and sports
team owners because it is generally a cheaper option than private
negotiations.141 As stated above, sports team owners and city officials did
not widely use eminent domain before the Kelo decision.142 Now, cities are

136. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 521–22.
137. See id. at 520–21.
138. See id. at 521.
139. Typically, the courts have ruled that “just compensation” means the fair market
value of the property. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 569–70 (1897); see also Kirby
Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1984).
140. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 501 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
141. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
142. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
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unafraid to use eminent domain to acquire land to appease sports team
owners threatening to leave. After the Kelo decision, cities like
Washington, D.C., Orlando, Sacramento, and New York City began to
realize the benefits of eminent domain.143 Some residents whose properties
were seized by their city under eminent domain challenged its use in
court,144 asserting that building a sports stadium or arena on the land was
not for a public purpose.145 The challenges failed, and the courts upheld
the takings by looking to Kelo, which established a broad precedent that
gives an inordinate amount of latitude to government officials.
i. Nationals Park: Eminent Domain in the Nation’s Capital
In 2005, professional baseball and the MLB returned to Washington,
D.C. The new team, the Washington Nationals, began playing in Robert F.
Kennedy (RFK) Stadium, located in Northeast Washington, D.C., which
the City built in 1961 for the previous D.C. MLB team. 146 While the
stadium could easily house a baseball diamond and had ample room for
40,000 fans, RFK Stadium lacked many amenities that newer stadiums
included.147 The Nationals’s owners wanted to find a location closer to
D.C.’s landmarks, with easy access to public transportation and, most
importantly, cost-controlled land they could build on. They ultimately
decided on the Navy Yard Waterfront in Southeast D.C. for the new
stadium.148 They intended to use the new stadium to revitalize and bring
significant development to the area. They encountered one problem — the
land was not for sale. The City officials, consequently, decided to invoke
eminent domain to take the 21 acres the Nationals’ owners needed to build

143. See infra Section II.C.
144. In Goldstein v. Pataki, the plaintiffs filed their lawsuits against the defendants, some
separately, while others together. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53–54 (2d Cir.
2008). Eventually, the court consolidated the lawsuits into one action with multiple claims.
See id.
145. See id. at 55.
146. See Robert McCartney, Bye-Bye, Bouncy Seats: District to Raze RFK Stadium by
2021, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dcpolitics/district-to-raze-rfk-stadium-by-2021--but-not-necessarily-so-redskins-can-build-anew-one/2019/09/05/48b18fc6-cfea-11e9-87fa-8501a456c003_story.html?arc404=true
[https://perma.cc/EJA6-LH3P]. The stadium was named after former Senator Robert F.
Kennedy. See id.
147. See David Nakamura, Long Before the World Series, This Ragtag Group of D.C.
Property Owners Was Evicted to Make Way for Baseball, WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2019, 4:00
PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/long-before-the-world-series-this-ragtag-group-of-d
c-property-owners-was-evicted-to-make-way-for-baseball/2019/10/24/50a945c8-f4d6-11e98cf0-4cc99f74d127_story.html [https://perma.cc/FB4P-78QA].
148. See id.
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the stadium. 149 The D.C. Government sent the 23 landowners eviction
letters, allowing them 90 days to move. 150 The City’s Director of
Development, Stephen Green, stated that “we thought the neighborhood
offered a huge economic development opportunity. But this was not about
displacing people. There were very few people down there to displace.”151
Sixteen of the 23 landowners filed for court-monitored arbitration, and each
settled with the City for more than the initial offer.152 Although many of
the owners believed that they were undercompensated, they also asserted
they had few options because it was impossible to fight the City’s use of
eminent domain successfully.153
In the Nationals Park case, Justice O’Connor’s prediction proved true —
the D.C. Government took property from private entities (the original
landowners) and transferred it to another private entity (the Washington
Nationals).154 Furthermore, given the assertion that the stadium was part of
an economic development plan for the Navy Yard Waterfront, City
officials were willing to displace people if it meant building a new sports
stadium. 155 In Justice O’Connor’s dissent, she worried that the Kelo
majority gave the government license to take away property from those
with few resources and give to those who have more.156
The effect of Kelo makes any property, particularly property belonging
to those with more limited means, vulnerable to a taking if the government
asserts that the property will be put to more profitable use, as exemplified
by the building of Nationals Park. Furthermore, the Nationals Park case
indicates how local governments view parcels of land as numbers on a
piece of paper — they are not concerned about removing what they
consider to be an inconsequential number of people from their homes to
build the stadium or arena.157
ii. Goldstein v. Pataki: The Nets Move to Brooklyn
In 2012, the NBA’s New Jersey Nets moved from Newark, New Jersey,
to Brooklyn, New York, arguing that the move would increase the value of

149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. See id. The City arguably overcompensated the 23 landowners by offering them $95
million for the land, which was only valued at $32 million. See id.
153. See id.
154. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 502 (2005).
155. See Nakamura, supra note 147.
156. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505.
157. See Nakamura, supra note 147.
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the franchise. 158 The targeted land for the new arena in Brooklyn was
expensive and privately owned. 159 The price of the land and difficult
negotiations with the landowners led the Brooklyn Nets to lobby local
officials to use eminent domain to acquire the desired private land.160 To
further convince the local government that building the arena was in the
best interest of the neighborhood, the Brooklyn Nets proposed economic
development plans to construct a $4 billion project of residential and office
spaces along with the arena.161 The local government, made up of various
officials, agencies, and subdivisions of New York State, along with the
Nets, took the position that this land was “blighted” under a definition in
New York State law, allowing the government to use eminent domain to
acquire the land.162 The residents who stood to lose their land challenged
the taking in the Southern District of New York and appealed the District
Court’s adverse decision to the Second Circuit.163 The residents contended
that the City’s labeling of the project as an economic development of a
“blighted” area was a mere pretext to meet Kelo’s public use and purpose
standards.164
The Second Circuit in Goldstein v. Pataki followed the Supreme Court’s
precedent from Berman to Kelo. The court held that “[a]s Berman and
Rosenthal illustrate, the redevelopment of a blighted area, even standing
alone, represents a ‘classic example of a taking for a public use.’”165 The
role the courts play in reviewing a legislature’s judgment of what
constitutes a public use is a narrow one.166 Further, the court stated that
“[t]he public-use requirement will be satisfied as long as the purpose
involves ‘developing [a blighted] area to create conditions that would

158. See David Lengel, Goodbye New Jersey as Nets Head to Brooklyn, GUARDIAN (Apr.
24,
2012,
9:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/2012/apr/24/new-jersey-nets-goodbye-brooklyn
[https://perma.cc/2KLT-VY58]; see also Joshua Berlinger, Why Half of Brooklyn Hates the
New Barclay’s Center Stadium, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 29, 2012, 1:06 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/why-half-of-brooklyn-hates-the-new-barclays-center-stadi
um-2012-8 [https://perma.cc/6235-KRYN].
159. See Berlinger, supra note 158.
160. See id.
ST.
DEV.,
161. See
About
Atlantic
Yards,
EMPIRE
https://esd.ny.gov/subsidiaries_projects/ayp/ayaboutus.html [https://perma.cc/EK57-ZXXR]
(last visited Oct. 23, 2020).
162. See Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Berlinger, supra
note 158.
163. See Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 55.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 59 (quoting Rosenthal & Rosenthal Inc. v. N.Y. State Urb. Dev. Corp., 771
F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1985)).
166. See id. at 57.
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prevent a reversion to blight in the future.’”167 The Second Circuit rejected
the residents’ argument that the government lacked a basis to label the land
as blighted and had merely done so to satisfy Kelo’s public purpose
requirement.168 The Second Circuit held that mere suspicion of improper
reasoning behind the taking did not require the court to scrutinize the
taking and the legislative choice.169 The Second Circuit reiterated the line
from Midkiff that it is the taking’s purpose, not its mechanics, that must
pass scrutiny under the Public Use Clause.170 The court held
[a]ccordingly, we must reject the notion that, in a single sentence, the
Kelo majority sought sub silentio to overrule Berman, Midkiff, and over a
century of precedent and to require federal courts in all cases to give close
scrutiny to the mechanics of a taking rationally related to a classic public
use as a means to gauge the purity of the motives of the various
government officials who approved it.171

The deferential treatment in Kelo supported the court’s conclusion that
“the mere fact that a private party stands to benefit from a proposed taking
does not suggest its purpose is invalid because ‘[q]uite simply, the
government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual
private parties.’”172 Kelo, consequently, makes it difficult for a landowner
to challenge a public taking because Kelo requires courts to defer to the
legislature’s statement that the taking fit a public purpose.
iii. Sacramento Kings: Eminent Domain Usage Spreads to the West Coast
The NBA’s Sacramento Kings struggled with attendance, and its arena
needed drastic renovations.173 Instead of renovating, however, the Kings
decided to build a new arena closer to downtown Sacramento by using
eminent domain to acquire the necessary land.174 On January 7, 2014, the
Sacramento City Council voted 7–2 in favor of authorizing the use of

167. Id. at 60 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 484 (2005))
(alteration in original).
168. See id. at 60–65.
169. See id. at 62.
170. See id. (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984)).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 64 (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 485) (alteration in original).
173. See Ryan Lillis, Despite Another Down Season, Kings Attendance Hits 8-Year High,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Apr.
13,
2015,
10:04
AM),
https://www.sacbee.com/sports/nba/sacramento-kings/article18355862.html
[https://perma.cc/Y3L5-ZH3T].
174. See id.; see also Nick Sibilla, Sacramento Approves Eminent Domain to Build an
NBA
Arena,
INST.
FOR
JUST.
(Jan.
14,
2014),
https://ij.org/action-post/sacramento-approves-eminent-domain-to-build-an-nba-arena/
[https://perma.cc/L47G-BGCM].
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eminent domain and provided almost $258 million worth of subsidies to the
team to build the sports arena. 175 One of the two dissenters,
Councilmember Darrell Fong, asserted that “[t]he right to take a necessity,
to take property, I do have serious concerns. I’ve given this a lot of thought
and it does not cross a threshold for me to use eminent domain.”176
To understand why the City Council ignored these objections in
ultimately approving the use of eminent domain requires a look at the
context surrounding the vote. Sacramento does not have any teams in the
four major sports leagues other than the NBA’s Sacramento Kings.177 In
2013, rumors swirled that an investment group from Seattle, Washington,
was attempting to buy the Kings and move the team to Seattle.178 To keep
the Kings in Sacramento, City officials conceded to the team owners’
demands, rationalizing that the negative press politicians would receive
from the team leaving Sacramento was too much to bear.179 Despite the
City Council’s authorization of eminent domain, the mortgage holders of
one of the holdout parcels challenged the taking in state court. 180 The
California Superior Court ruled that the City had the right to take the
property by eminent domain. 181 Following this ruling, the two sides

175. See Sibilla, supra note 174; see also Bob Moffitt, Council Approves Eminent
Domain
for
Arena
Project,
CAPRADIO
(Jan.
8,
2014),
https://www.capradio.org/articles/2014/01/08/council-approves-eminent-domain-for-arena-p
roject/ [https://perma.cc/7XM5-5SF7].
176. See Moffit, supra note 175; see also Sibilla, supra note 174.
177. See Cork Gaines, Chart: Some US Cities May Have Too Many Pro Sports Teams,
BUS.
INSIDER
(Nov.
8,
2013,
7:52
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/chart-some-us-cities-may-have-too-many-pro-sports-team
s-2013-11 [https://perma.cc/FF5S-6HCC].
178. See Ken Belson, Two Investment Groups Present Pitches for Kings, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
3,
2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/04/sports/basketball/groups-of-investors-make-pitches-fo
r-sacramento-kings.html [https://perma.cc/YKV4-7KX6]. Seattle had recently lost its NBA
team to Oklahoma City after Seattle declined to build a new arena; Oklahoma City built a
new arena. See id.
179. See id. Indeed, Seattle, perhaps recognizing its error and feeling pressure from fans
for the loss of its team, actively courted the Kings to move with promises of a new arena.
See id.; see also Branden Fitzpatrick, NBA Rumors: 5 Reasons Why the Kings Have to Stay
in
Sacramento,
BLEACHER
REP.
(Feb.
22,
2012),
https://bleacherreport.com/articles/1076709-nba-rumors-5-reasons-why-the-kings-have-to-st
ay-in-sacramento [https://perma.cc/LLQ7-HCYD].
180. See Judge Gives Sacramento Possession of Old Macy’s Building in Downtown,
CAPRADIO (Mar. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Judge Gives Sacramento Possession],
https://www.capradio.org/articles/2014/03/21/judge-finalizes-ruling-in-eminent-domain-are
na-case/ [https://perma.cc/L63J-L8TS].
181. See Kulkarni, Aguilar-Guerrero & Skinner, supra note 17; see also Ryan Lillis,
Sacramento Kings Will Pay $12 Million for Former Macy’s Property Under Court
Settlement,
SACRAMENTO
BEE
(Feb.
11,
2015,
7:32
AM),
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negotiated over what constituted just compensation,182 eventually settling
for $12 million, an amount between the two sides’ expert appraisals.183
The City Council justified the use of eminent domain as generally good
for the community.184 These politicians, however, did not verify in exact
numbers how building a new sports arena downtown would help the
community. The City provided $258 million in subsidies to the sports team
and further angered its citizens by taking their private land for an NBA
team that plays 41 home games each year.185 The mortgage holders of the
land challenged the ruling because they believed the City would not offer
fair compensation for the parcel of land.186 The landowner still lost the
case because Kelo’s broad interpretation of the use of eminent domain gave
the City significant discretion with which land to take.187 This taking is
allowed under Kelo even if the taken private property is given to another
private individual for a sports stadium — in essence, using eminent domain
without any limitation.
iv. Audi Field: Eminent Domain Returns to the District
MLS’s D.C. United has a long history in Washington, D.C. 188 The
soccer club has struggled during the past 15 years, even though the
popularity of many other teams in the MLS has skyrocketed. 189 After
playing for years in the old RFK stadium, the team desperately needed a
new facility.190 In the early 2010s, when D.C. United looked for a new

https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/city-beat/article9711272.html
[https://perma.cc/ZQP5-2G2D].
182. See Lillis, supra note 181.
183. See id.
184. The City Council believed the new arena was in the best interests of the City
because it would bring significant economic growth. See id.
185. See Sibilla, supra note 174; see also Lillis, supra note 181; Ian McMahan, How
Sleep and Jet-Lag Influences Success in the Travel-Crazy NBA, GUARDIAN (Oct. 26, 2018,
4:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/sport/2018/oct/26/sleep-nba-effects-basketball
[https://perma.cc/RT7S-TM2C].
186. See Judge Gives Sacramento Possession, supra note 180; Moffitt, supra note 175.
187. See Judge Gives Sacramento Possession, supra note 180; Lillis, supra note 181. See
generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
188. See Graham Ruthven, Wayne Rooney Has Driven a Revolution at DC United,
GUARDIAN
(May
20,
2019,
5:00
AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/football/2019/may/20/wayne-rooney-dc-united-mls-soccer
[https://perma.cc/GFY5-JJ4N].
189. See id.; see also Michael LoRé, Soccer’s Growth in U.S. Has International Legends
Buzzing,
FORBES
(Apr.
26,
2019,
12:16
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaellore/2019/04/26/soccers-growth-in-u-s-has-internation
al-legends-buzzing/#1227a1e17f1a [https://perma.cc/BYX7-99Z4].
190. See Pablo Iglesias Maurer, D.C. United Is About to Get a New Home. Is the Team
Ready
for
Its
Close-Up?,
DCIST
(June
13,
2018,
4:30
PM),
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stadium, the team immediately focused on Buzzard Point because
Nationals Park had already proved successful in revitalizing the nearby
area.191 D.C. United pushed the City to use eminent domain to take the
Buzzard Point land for its new stadium.192 D.C. United argued it would
benefit by saving on land costs, allowing the team to allocate more money
towards amenities in the stadium. Although the sports team owners
privately negotiated with the landowners, one holdout wanted more than
the City had offered.193 When the private negotiations fell apart, the City
filed an action in the D.C. Superior Court seeking to use eminent domain to
take control of the holdout property and have a judge in the D.C. Superior
Court decide on the price of the land.194
When the City filed suit against the holdout landowner, it used eminent
domain to seize property from a private entity to give it to another private
entity.195 In the filing, the D.C. Government stated that the local statutes
gave them authority to take the land for the public purpose of the D.C.
citizens.196 Further, the City defined that public purpose by stating

https://dcist.com/story/18/06/13/is-dc-united-ready-for-its-close-up/
[https://perma.cc/EK2V-ZU4Q].
191. See Michelle Goldchain, D.C. United Stadium to Be MLS’ Priciest Crown Jewel,
CURBED
(Nov.
5,
2014,
3:24
PM),
https://dc.curbed.com/2014/11/5/10026696/dc-united-stadium-to-be-mls-priciest-crown-jew
el [https://perma.cc/5H6Q-X3JV]; Michael Neibauer, D.C. Seizes Full Control of D.C.
United
Stadium
Site,
WASH. BUS. J.
(Oct.
1,
2015,
9:53
AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/breaking_ground/2015/09/d-c-seizes-full-controlof-d-c-united-stadium-site.html
[https://perma.cc/UKP8-YCME?type=image];
Daniel
Sernovitz, Akridge Wins Buzzard Point Eminent Domain Case. Here’s How Much D.C. Will
Have
to
Pay,
WASH.
BUS.
J.
(June
14,
2018,
11:33
AM),
https://www.bizjournals.com/washington/news/2018/06/13/akridge-wins-buzzard-point-emi
nent-domain-case.html [https://perma.cc/LCY5-5KRD?type=image].
192. See Sernovitz, supra note 191.
193. See Aaron Wiener, The D.C. United Stadium Deal, by the Numbers, WASH. CITY
PAPER
(June
24,
2014),
https://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/news/housing-complex/blog/13124161/the-d-c-unite
d-stadium-deal-by-the-numbers [https://perma.cc/E473-HJ4K]. The two parties could not
agree on the price. See id.
194. See id.; see also Neibauer, supra note 191; Sernovitz, supra note 191.
195. See Neibauer, supra note 191.
196. Specifically, the D.C. Government cited the language:
[C]ontained in D.C. Official Code § 16-1311 (2001), the Soccer Stadium
Development Act of 2014, D.C. Law 20-233, the Soccer Stadium Development
Technical Clarification Temporary Amendment Act of 2015, D.C. Law 21-17, and
the Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Support Emergency Act of 2015, D.C. Act 21-127,
and as set forth in the Declaration of Taking filed simultaneously herewith.
Complaint at 2, D.C. v. SW Land Holder, LLC, No. 2015 Civ. 007569E (D.C. Super. Ct.
Sept. 30, 2015).
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[t]he public purpose for which District of Columbia hereby takes the
Property is for the construction and operation of a soccer stadium
complex, including a stadium and facilities functionally related and
subordinate thereto, and the accompanying infrastructure including
parking, office, and transportation facilities, in order to promote the
recreation, entertainment and enjoyment of the public.197

The Washington, D.C., Government asserted the soccer stadium fits
this public purpose under the D.C. statute, which allowed them to take
the land to build a new state-of-the-art facility.
Not only did Washington, D.C., use eminent domain to acquire the land,
but also the City gave D.C. United the largest subsidy in MLS history at
$183 million. 198 Although the City initially estimated the construction
costs to be around $290 million, the stadium ended up costing over $400
million after the legal battles over the use of eminent domain.199 To help
fund this project, the City shifted around $32 million in its budget away
from other areas of social need, such as school improvement.200 Because
the City paid for around 46% of the stadium bill, as the costs rose, so did
the City’s expenses.201 Yet City officials continued to view the new D.C.
United Stadium project as essential to the neighborhood’s economic
development. 202 In a public report on the cost-benefit analysis of the
stadium, the City explained that the new stadium would bring in $109.4
million in benefits over 32 years along with about 1,683 full-time or
equivalent jobs. 203 Economic studies question these alleged financial
benefits and present evidence that new sports stadiums or arenas do not
automatically bring in new revenue, especially when the public heavily
subsidizes the stadium.204

197. Id.
198. See Michael Farren, DC Taxpayers to Fund Nearly Half of New Stadium Costs,
BRIDGE
(July
25,
2018),
https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/dc-taxpayers-fund-nearly-half-new-stadium-c
osts [https://perma.cc/T49A-8WX2].
199. See id.; Michelle Goldchain, New Renderings Released for Planned D.C. United
Stadium,
CURBED
(Jan.
21,
2016,
11:00
AM),
https://dc.curbed.com/2016/1/21/10844964/dc-united-renderings-new
[https://perma.cc/85BN-5YY6].
200. See Farren, supra note 198.
201. See id.
202. See generally CONVENTIONS, SPORTS & LEISURE INT’L ET AL., COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS OF THE SOCCER STADIUM DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2014 (2014),
http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/31817/B20-0805-FINAL-Report—
-Cost-Benefit-Analysis50.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6AB-NRD6].
203. See id.
204. See Pat Garofalo & Travis Waldron, If You Build It, They Might Not Come: The
Risky
Economics
of
Sports
Stadiums,
ATLANTIC
(Sept.
7,
2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/09/if-you-build-it-they-might-not-come-
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D. Future Problems of Eminent Domain with Sports Stadiums
These previous instances of local governments using eminent domain for
sports stadiums are not isolated incidents. Players and fans demand new
amenities in these stadiums, and sports team owners pressure cities to
comply with the requests of their players and fans. 205 As technology
improves, fan experiences change, and fans often demand the latest
enhanced features and conveniences.206 The Texas Rangers, which used
eminent domain to acquire the land for its baseball stadium in 1991,
already replaced that stadium by 2020.207 The old stadium only lasted 26
years.208
In these stadium and arena cases, the cities’ economic development
arguments meet Kelo’s standards because the holding in Kelo allows for
broad public purpose discretion. City governments argue their use of
eminent domain supports economic growth by improving an area and
providing jobs. 209 Further, city governments often assert that the new
stadium or arena will result in higher tax revenue.210 Cities, however, do
not discuss or bring up the costs that eminent domain-related legal battles

the-risky-economics-of-sports-stadiums/260900/ [https://perma.cc/5ULW-MFK2]; Clifton
B. Parker, Sports Stadiums Do Not Generate Significant Local Economic Growth, Stanford
NEWS
(July
30,
2015),
Expert
Says,
STAN.
https://news.stanford.edu/2015/07/30/stadium-economics-noll-073015/
[https://perma.cc/42MF-MRG7]; Rick Paulas, Sports Stadiums Are a Bad Deal for Cities:
But
Cities
Can
Fight
Back,
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
21,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/11/sports-stadiums-can-be-bad-cities/
576334/ [https://perma.cc/59UC-Z6H2].
205. See Gordon, supra note 18; see also Troy McMullen, Luxury Housing Marks the
Latest Trend in Stadium Amenities Around the Country, WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/luxury-housing-marks-the-latest-trend-in-stadiu
m-amenities-around-the-country/2017/04/20/c07dd14e-b8a1-11e6-959c-172c82123976_stor
y.html [https://perma.cc/WZ78-MEBC].
206. See Broughton, supra note 120.
207. See IJ Action, Foul Ball, supra note 23.
208. As other teams in the MLB modernized their stadiums, the Rangers realized how
outdated its stadium had become. Seeing as baseball is played in the summer, it also made
the architectural error of building a baseball stadium in Texas without a roof. The team lost
thousands of fans every year because it was too hot to sit in the Texas summer sun. The
Texas Rangers corrected this mistake by building a new, domed stadium. See Dan Solomon,
The Texas Rangers’ Shiny New Stadium Embodies the ‘New Arlington,’ TEX. MONTHLY
(Feb.
28,
2020),
https://www.texasmonthly.com/the-culture/new-texas-rangers-stadium-arlington/
[https://perma.cc/T47Z-RSXX].
209. See Zimbalist & Noll, supra note 121; see also McMullen, supra note 205.
210. For example, City officials asserted that tax revenue for the new Texas Rangers’
baseball stadium would help justify its costs. See Jason Notte, One Thing Gets Lost in Plans
for an Expensive Texas Baseball Stadium: Math, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 24, 2016, 1:50 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/one-thing-gets-lost-in-plans-for-an-expensive-texas-ba
seball-stadium-math-2016-10-24 [https://perma.cc/77B2-H63B].
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cause. The legal actions add to the construction costs because the teams
believe they would acquire the land at a less expensive price. In the four
recent cases mentioned above in Section II.C, the legal battles added to the
expenditure for the cities. Going to court for several months, if not years,
is expensive for both parties and might wipe out some of the gains the
cities acquired from using eminent domain.
The broad reading of the Takings Clause in Kelo gives the state
legislatures the power to define what “public use” and “public purpose”
satisfy the public use requirement. 211 Cities push the limits of Kelo
because if taking land for building a sports stadium is a public purpose,
then the city can acquire almost any land for a proposed economic
development. Unless the Supreme Court revises its reading of Kelo, sports
team owners are likely to continue to exploit eminent domain to acquire
their desired land.212 Urban areas in the United States are already densely
populated, with more people moving to cities from rural and suburban
areas.213 Consequently, there are few large tracts of vacant land for large
stadiums or arenas, especially close to the economic and social centers of
the cities. Teams can lobby cities to use eminent domain to reduce costs
and allow owners to reap substantial benefits.214 The inducement to use
eminent domain has even caused sports team owners to mandate its use in
their contracts with the cities.215

211. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 517 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
212. Specifically, in the Washington, D.C., area, the Washington Football Team plays in
one of the older NFL stadiums. In response, Dan Snyder, the owner of the team, wants to
build a new stadium. The location of Washington, D.C., puts Snyder in a unique situation
compared to other owners. Maryland and Virginia surround Washington, D.C. Therefore,
Snyder can actively approach all three locations and negotiate the best deal for himself and
the team. See Robert McCartney, Where Will Redskins Build New Stadium? Early Signs
Point to Current FedEx Site., WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/md-politics/where-will-redskins-build-new-stadiumearly-signs-point-to-current-fedex-site/2020/02/16/65375460-4eb0-11ea-bf44-f5043eb3918
a_story.html [https://perma.cc/HN8E-LMJR]. The search for a new home for the
Washington Football Team raises the possibility that states and cities could use eminent
domain in the immediate future to acquire the needed land. See Martin Austermuhle, Nats
Park Helped Remake a D.C. Neighborhood. Could a New Stadium at RFK Do the Same?,
NPR
(Nov.
18,
2019),
https://www.npr.org/local/305/2019/11/18/780434977/nats-park-helped-remake-a-d-c-neigh
borhood-could-a-new-stadium-at-r-f-k-do-the-same [https://perma.cc/TV85-7CXQ].
213. See Schneider, supra note 22.
214. See Bryce, supra note 113.
215. See Chris Perfett, The Clippers Want a New Home. For Inglewood, It’s Not So
Simple.: Lawsuits, Regulations and City Woes Cloud a New Arena Proposal, USC STORY
SPACE,
https://uscstoryspace.com/2017-2018/clemieux/Investigation/
[https://perma.cc/372L-UUCR] (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
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For example, the NBA’s Los Angeles Clippers currently plays its home
games at the Staples Center, which opened in 1999.216 The Clippers share
this arena with the NBA’s Los Angeles Lakers and the NHL’s Los Angeles
Kings.217 The Clippers want its own arena to play in, as the Lakers and
Kings are contractually the main tenants of the Staples Center and earn
higher percentages of the arena’s revenue.218 Building a new arena would
give the Clippers its own identity and raise the value of the team.219 The
Los Angeles Clippers faces two issues — the cost of land in Los Angeles
and the lack of available space to build a new arena.
In its current contract with Los Angeles, the Clippers have an eminent
domain clause. The clause states that if the Clippers cannot acquire the
land it wants for the new arena through private negotiations, then the City
would allow the Clippers to use eminent domain to obtain that land. 220
This provision is valuable for the Clippers because the team has proposed
to build the new arena in high-priced, heavily populated Inglewood,
California, near the new $5 billion NFL stadium. 221 This stipulation
provides a form of insurance to the Clippers if it cannot privately negotiate
the procurement of the needed land, and gives the Clippers a new stadium
when the contract clause kicks in. Recently, the Clippers agreed to buy the
old Los Angeles Forum, but if that deal falls apart, then the team can still
use the eminent domain clause to build a new arena.222
Another example of a sports team threatening to use eminent domain for
a new stadium is Miami’s MLS team. In 2015, it was posited that using
eminent domain to acquire the needed land was one option for the team’s

216. See The Greatest Moments in Staples Center History, DISCOVER L.A. (Oct. 17,
2019),
https://www.discoverlosangeles.com/things-to-do/the-greatest-moments-in-staples-center-hi
story [https://perma.cc/E8SH-EP7W].
217. See id.
218. See Perfett, supra note 215; see also Andrew Greif, Clippers Reveal Renderings for
Proposed 18,500-seat Inglewood Arena, L.A. TIMES (July 25, 2019, 6:30 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/sports/clippers/story/2019-07-25/clippers-arena-inglewood-renderi
ngs-steve-ballmer [https://perma.cc/2G57-NVRK].
219. See Greif, supra note 218.
220. See Perfett, supra note 215.
221. See Scott Davis & Libertina Brandt, American Airlines Will Pay $90 Million to
Sponsor the Massive, $5 Billion Los Angeles Stadium the Rams and Chargers Will Call
Home — Take a Look Inside, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2019, 6:26 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/la-stadium-photos-chargers-rams-2018-3
[https://perma.cc/EM7G-9788]; Greif, supra note 218.
222. See Ohm Youngisuk, Clippers’ Steve Ballmer Reaches Deal to Buy Forum for
$400M
in
Cash,
ESPN
(Mar.
24,
2020),
https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/28949728/clippers-steve-ballmer-reaches-deal-buy-for
um-400m [https://perma.cc/6EMX-WT89]; see also Perfett, supra note 215.
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owners, one of whom is retired soccer star David Beckham.223 Because the
team has no current stadium, obtaining the desired land is critical to the
success of the Miami team. In addition to the stadium, renderings of the
surrounding area also depicted other forms of economic development.224
The team proposed plans to build new parks and fields for local people to
enjoy, along with plans to build retail stores and restaurants in the area.225
As of right now, the team will not need to use eminent domain, as the team
will build the stadium on land owned by the City — a byproduct of a
referendum.226 The threat of eminent domain to take the land, however,
positioned the team more favorably in negotiations with the City to obtain
land — land the City could have used for other developments such as more
residential housing.227 The City, however, believed that an MLS stadium
might be a better fit for the area.228
E. The Power of Sports in People’s Lives
Building new sports stadiums and arenas is not always a negative
investment, as many stadiums and arenas become financially successful.229
Furthermore, cities generally need to replace or renovate old stadiums or
arenas as they reach the end of their useful life. When a stadium or arena
becomes outdated, fans’ attendance drops, harming the businesses around
the stadium or arena. When a city builds a new stadium or arena, by
contrast, the new facility, at least initially, draws people to attend games,

223. See Douglas Hanks & David Smiley, Beckham to Miami Mayor: Soccer Stadium
Next to Marlins Park Can Be ‘World-Class,’ MIA. HERALD (July 22, 2015, 5:39 PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article28288822.html
[https://perma.cc/558G-BV5J].
224. See id.; see also Sydney Franklin, Plans for David Beckham’s Freedom Park Come
to Life in New Renderings, ARCHITECT’S NEWSPAPER (Nov. 8, 2019),
https://archpaper.com/2019/11/david-beckham-miami-freedom-park-prevote/
[https://perma.cc/GW44-KL8N].
225. See Franklin, supra note 224.
226. See Miami Referendums: MLS Soccer Stadium and Miami River Approved, ‘Strong
Mayor’
Rejected,
NBC
MIA.
(Nov.
7,
2018,
1:33
AM),
https://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/miami-referendums-mls-soccer-stadium-strong-may
or/167371/ [https://perma.cc/AZ6Z-HX2L].
227. The Miami team currently has two proposals to build its stadium on one of two
parcels of property. It is looking into which parcel of land will be less expensive and more
convenient for the location of its stadium and has yet to decide on the final location. See
Douglas Hanks, Beckham May Have Another Play in Overtown. Partner Wants to Develop
Land
There,
MIA.
HERALD
(Apr.
1,
2019,
4:33
PM),
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article228425794.html
[https://perma.cc/RAT7-B2MG].
228. See id.
229. See Austermuhle, supra note 212; see also McMullen, supra note 205.
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spend money at the games, and frequent nearby businesses.230 If the city
develops the area around the stadium or arena, fans are likely to patronize
those areas before and after the game.231
Two previously mentioned stadiums and arenas —Nationals Park and
Barclays Center — provide good examples of this increase in revenue for
the area around the stadium or arena. Before Washington, D.C., built
Capital One Arena and, later, Nationals Park, certain regions of the City
were in decline; the new facilities, therefore, changed the City’s
landscape.232 D.C.’s Chinatown and Navy Yard Waterfront neighborhoods
are virtually unrecognizable today because of both regions’ development
that occurred after the building of the arena and stadium. Developers
noticed the economic viabilities in these regions and decided to construct
offices and residential buildings there.233 The developments of Chinatown
and the Navy Yard Waterfront would not likely have occurred, at least to
the present extent, without the sports facilities serving as key
components.234 Barclays Center has also proven successful in the Atlantic
Yards Brooklyn area by expanding residential and commercial buildings
along with acres of publicly accessible open space.235 These developments
and subsequently generated revenue would not necessarily have
materialized without these facilities drawing fans to the games.236

230. See generally Dan Coates & Brad Humphreys, Novelty Effects of New Facilities on
Attendance at Professional Sporting Events (Univ. of MD., Balt. Cnty., Working Paper No.
03-101, 2003) (explaining that new sports stadiums around the country do see the novelty
effect of an increase in attendance. When a team builds a new stadium or arena, they expect
to see not only a bump in attendance but also a corresponding increase in revenue).
231. See, e.g., Andrew Weiland, Commentary: Fiserv Forum a Huge Success,
MILWAUKEE
BUS.
NEWS
(May
13,
2019,
12:00
AM),
https://biztimes.com/fiserv-forum-a-huge-success/ [https://perma.cc/3SP7-C5QN] (arguing
that the arena brings in a lot of revenue for the City because of the different events it hosts
beyond just NBA basketball alone).
232. See Austermuhle, supra note 212; see also McMullen, supra note 205. Capital One
Arena, built in 1997, is home to Washington, D.C.’s NHL and NBA teams. The arena,
located in D.C.’s Chinatown area, brought a major transformation to the region. See
Sasha-Ann Simons, 20 Years Later: How a D.C. Arena Marked a Major Transition in
Chinatown,
WAMU
88.5
(Dec.
1,
2017),
https://wamu.org/story/17/12/01/20-years-later-d-c-arena-marked-major-transition-chinatow
n/ [https://perma.cc/7DGT-WSJS].
233. See Jeff Clabaugh, Navy Yard Growth Isn’t All Because of Nationals, WTOP NEWS
(Mar.
31,
2017,
4:59
AM),
https://wtop.com/business-finance/2017/03/navy-yard-growth-isnt-nationals/
[https://perma.cc/6RAG-WDA7].
234. See McMullen, supra note 205.
235. See id.
236. See id.; see also Austermuhle, supra note 212.
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These economic benefits deriving from the construction of stadiums
occur because fans spend money on sports teams. 237 The emotional
attachment that supporters have for their sports teams and the civic pride
that followers display for their teams are hard to quantify, but the success
of sports in the United States and around the world illustrates the strength
of this attachment and pride. 238 For example, fans collectively spend
billions of dollars every year for each of the four major sports leagues.239
Sports teams endow local supporters with a sense of community pride.240
Consider attendance when a local team has a championship run; the
pictures and videos of the city’s fans celebrating for the team corroborate
this point.241
The positivity and sense of identification with a team can also offer its
followers a distraction from the hardships and difficulties of daily life. For
example, the first public event in Las Vegas after the Vegas shooting242
was the NHL game on October 1, 2017, between the new Vegas Golden
Knights and San Jose Sharks.243 The pre-game ceremony was emotional,

237. Fans care so much about their teams that, back in 2017, they collectively spent over
$100 billion on all sport activities in a 12-month span. This entails spending over $56 billion
on attending sporting events alone, which included tickets, transportation, and food and
beverage. See Steven Kutz, $100 Billion — That’s How Much Americans Spent on Sports
over the Past 12 Months, MARKETWATCH (Sept. 12, 2017, 4:25 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/heres-how-much-americans-spend-on-sports-in-one-ch
art-2017-09-11 [https://perma.cc/3REW-P63E]. A study by PricewaterhouseCoopers
showed that people in the United States spent $71 billion on sports. See Joe Drape, Ken
Belson & Billy Witz, The Coronavirus Doesn’t Care When Sports Come Back, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr.
19,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/19/sports/coronavirus-sports-economy.html?action=click
&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage [https://perma.cc/U8XA-NMT8].
238. See Gordon, supra note 18.
239. See Kutz, supra note 237.
240. See generally Jason Mays, Fan Loyalty and Motivation (2012) (Theses,
Dissertations, Professional Papers, & Capstones, University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
241. Studies have shown strong correlations between attendance spikes and good team
performance, and the inverse correlation when teams start losing. See Ben Langhorst, What
Do Your Fans Want? Attendance Correlations with Performance, Ticket Prices, and Payroll
Factors, 43 BASEBALL RSCH. J. 101 (2014); see also Darren B. Glass, Fair-Weather Fans:
The Correlation Between Attendance and Winning Percentage, 32 BASEBALL RSCH. J. 81,
81–84 (2003).
242. See Kieran Corcoran, Sinéad Baker & David Choi, The FBI Has Closed Its
Investigation of the Las Vegas Mass Shooting That Killed 58 People and Injured Hundreds
More. Here’s Exactly How the Nation’s Worst Modern Gun Massacre Unfolded, BUS.
INSIDER
(Jan.
29,
2019,
11:35
PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/timeline-shows-exactly-how-the-las-vegas-massacre-unfol
ded-2018-9 [https://perma.cc/PZZ8-32DT].
243. See Kevin Allen, Vegas Golden Knights Make History with Big Win in Emotional
Home
Opener,
USA
TODAY
(Oct.
11,
2017,
3:53
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nhl/golden-knights/2017/10/10/vegas-golden-knight
s-make-history-in-home-opener/752900001/ [https://perma.cc/6UUZ-BWKD]; see also
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as the teams commemorated the lives of the 58 people who died in the
shooting.244 The Las Vegas NHL team became a rallying point for the City
after the shooting.245 Similarly, following the Boston Marathon Bombing,
the Red Sox became Boston’s focal point when, five days after the
bombing, first baseman David Ortiz gave an emotional and well-received
speech to the City.246 In 2006, in the first game in the Superdome after
Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans Saints beat the Atlanta Falcons 23–
3.247 Many people argued that the game that night was a “symbol of the
city’s rebirth” and the greatest night in all of New Orleans history. 248
Perhaps one of the most famous moments of cities turning to sports in the
wake of tragedy was during the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. The
New York Mets won a dramatic home baseball game ten days after the
attacks, and local newspapers labeled the win as a healing moment for
traumatized New Yorkers.249 In the darkest moments for many of these
people, sports offered an outlet and distraction, a benefit that cannot be
easily dismissed.

Emily Kaplan, Fifteen Days That Defined the Golden Knights’ Season, ESPN (June 12,
2018),
https://www.espn.com/nhl/story/_/id/23762995/nhl-remembering-vegas-golden-knights-ridi
culous-inaugural-season [https://perma.cc/3AUF-AV8T].
244. See Hemal Jhaveri, Golden Knights Honor Victims of Las Vegas Shooting in
Emotional Opening Ceremony, USA TODAY (Oct. 10, 2017, 11:12 PM),
https://ftw.usatoday.com/2017/10/golden-knights-honored-the-victims-of-las-vegas-shootin
g-in-emotional-opening-ceremony [https://perma.cc/LVX9-QV2Y].
245. The team won the first game and became the most successful expansion team in the
history of the four major professional leagues in the United States. See Kaplan, supra note
243. The team made it all the way to the Stanley Cup Finals, losing in five games to the
Washington Capitals. See id.
246. See Boston Marathon Terror Attack Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 4, 2020, 10:53 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/boston-marathon-terror-attack-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/XNT8-3ASJ]; Julian Benbow, David Ortiz’s Impassioned Speech Caps
Emotional Red Sox Pregame Ceremony, BOSTON.COM (Apr. 21, 2013),
https://www.boston.com/sports/boston-red-sox/2013/04/21/david-ortizs-impassioned-speech
-caps-emotional-red-sox-pregame-ceremony [https://perma.cc/X2JC-EFXN].
247. See Mike Triplett, Steve Gleason’s 2006 Blocked Punt Symbolized the ‘Rebirth’ of
the
Saints,
New
Orleans,
ESPN
(Apr.
6,
2020),
https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/17611735/steve-gleason-2006-blocked-punt-symbolize
d-rebirth-saints-new-orleans [https://perma.cc/7KCB-Y35S].
248. See id.
249. See Dave Consolazio, MLB: Remembering Mike Piazza’s Incredible Post-9/11
Home
Run,
SPORTSCASTING
(May
4,
2020),
https://www.sportscasting.com/mlb-remembering-mike-piazzas-incredible-post-9-11-homerun/ [https://perma.cc/6YCK-Y47P]. The Mets won when Mike Piazza hit a home run in the
bottom of the eighth inning. See Ryan Hatch, Mets’ Mike Piazza Hit Iconic 9/11 Home Run
15
Years
Ago
Wednesday,
NJ.COM
(Jan.
16,
2019),
https://www.nj.com/mets/2016/09/15_years_ago_today_mets_mike_piazza_hit_an_iconic.h
tml [https://perma.cc/9ZPQ-ZGYD].
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In sum, sports teams bring some economic benefits to cities — including
fans’ increased spending at and near stadiums and arenas and the
development of neighboring areas. 250 Sports also give the community
subjective benefits, the value of which is hard to express in dollars. In light
of these perceived benefits, cities are often willing to build new stadiums or
arenas to keep their teams or convince other teams to relocate there.251
III. ENDING SPORTS TEAMS’ EXPLOITATION OF KELO FOR SPORTS
STADIUMS
Part III first explores potential solutions to the excessive use of eminent
domain: (1) the Supreme Court narrows its reading of the Takings Clause
in Kelo, (2) state legislatures curb sports team owners’ exploitation of
eminent domain, and (3) state courts narrow takings under current state
laws. This Part then debates the usage of eminent domain and relocation
contractual provisions and analyzes the Public Purpose Doctrine.
While the benefits derived from a sports stadium or arena can be
consequential, a city’s ability to use eminent domain to obtain the land
necessary for these stadiums or arenas should not be so far reaching that it
would enable the city to transfer land from one private entity to another
private entity. Regardless of the perceived benefits, this expansive grant of
power stretches the limits of Kelo’s reading of public purpose beyond
public takings the Fifth Amendment allows.
In their Kelo dissents, Justices O’Connor and Thomas warned of the
majority’s far-reaching precedent. 252 Recent cases illustrate Justice
O’Connor’s uneasiness in the Kelo opinion, as courts and legislatures
accept that stadiums and economic development go hand in hand. 253
However, there are multiple solutions that prevent further eminent domain
overreach by sports team owners. This Note looks at five solutions that
help curtail this abuse and can be applied in the courts or the legislative
chambers: (1) the Supreme Court accepts a challenge to an eminent domain
taking and narrows Kelo, (2) the state legislatures enact stronger provisions
to their state laws interpreting the Takings Clause (Congress can also do
250. See McMullen, supra note 205.
251. See generally Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, Do Economists Reach a
Conclusion on Subsidies for Sports Franchises, Stadiums, and Mega-events?, 5 ECON J.
WATCH 294 (2008).
252. See generally Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 493–505 (2005)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 505–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
253. Justice O’Connor cautioned that under Kelo, “[a] sovereign may take private
property currently put to ordinary private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use,
so long as the new use is predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public —
such as increased tax revenue, more jobs, maybe even esthetic pleasure.” Id. at 501
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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this at the federal level), (3) if state legislatures are slow to act, then the
state courts can act and decide to read Kelo narrowly not to allow sports
stadiums to fit the mold of economic development, (4) cities and local
governments can negotiate contracts with sports teams that include
provisions that disallow relocation of the team and eminent domain use to
acquire private land, and (5) courts can look into applying the Public
Purpose Doctrine to eminent domain takings meant for publicly financed
sports stadiums and land acquisitions. All five of these responses would
individually help prevent excessive reliance by state and local governments
on eminent domain, yet some of them are easier to implement than others.
A. The Supreme Court Could Narrow Kelo
The most direct way to solve the exploitation of eminent domain is for
the Supreme Court to narrow Kelo. There are multiple ways to do so.
First, the Court could eliminate economic development as a justified public
purpose for a taking of private property by limiting the meaning of “public
use” in the Takings Clause. As Justice Thomas stated in his dissent,
“public use” should mean “public use only if the government or the public
actually uses the taken property.”254 “Public purpose,” as interpreted in
Kelo, has too expansive a meaning and opens the Takings Clause to
exploitation.255 By limiting “public use” to mean “actual” public use, the
Supreme Court could immediately limit eminent domain usage.256 Justice
Thomas’s dissent provides a blueprint that the current Supreme Court could
and should follow to limit eminent domain overuse.257 The Supreme Court
should revisit the Public Use Clause and consider returning to the original
meaning of the clause: that the government may take property only if it
actually uses it, gives the public a legal right to use it, or uses it to serve a
communal public purpose.258 A sports stadium or arena would not fit that
meaning because the public does not have an absolute right to utilize the
stadium, especially when the home team is not playing there. Such a
facility is a private interest. Local citizens have to pay the team’s
ownership for the privilege of having limited access to a sports stadium or
arena during a game.259

254. Id. at 514 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
255. See id. at 520–21.
256. The construction of a highway or public park are some examples of actual public
use. The public can use the land without having to pay, or by paying a minimal fee, for the
opportunity to do so. The government, whether at the state or local level, operates and holds
complete control of the land.
257. See generally Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505–23.
258. See id. at 514.
259. For examples of appropriate public use, see supra note 256.
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Narrowing Kelo would substantially limit the scope of eminent domain.
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion stated, “it has long been accepted that
the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of
transferring it to another private party B, even though A is paid just
compensation.” 260 Justice Stevens’s hypothetical of a Takings Clause
violation describes the current situations in the majority of eminent domain
cases for sports stadiums. One of the most expansive views of “public
purpose” involves using eminent domain to take land for sports stadiums or
arenas under the guise of economic development. If the Supreme Court
holds that economic development no longer serves as a public purpose or
use under the Takings Clause, then building sports stadiums will not serve
the public purpose to justify taking private land by eminent domain. A
narrow reading of Kelo would prevent cities from selling or leasing private
land acquired through eminent domain to private owners. By preventing
cities from condoning this private transaction, the narrow interpretation of
the Takings Clause would curtail the abuse of eminent domain specifically
by sports team owners because cities could no longer use eminent domain
to acquire private land for the sports team owners’ benefits.
Another way the Court can narrow Kelo in cases that rely on economic
development justifications for the taking is to apply a heightened scrutiny
test for economic development to assess the taking instead of deferring to
the legislature.
The heightened scrutiny test revolves around the
ascertainability of the level of economic development. 261 Currently, the

260. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
261. To adopt this test, the Court would look by analogy at other areas of the law that use
such a test in evaluating economic data or right to relief. For example, some circuit courts
use ascertainability as an extra element for Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(a) for
class certification, to see if there is an administratively feasible way to identify class
members. The class must be very clear, precise, and objective. See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661
F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirming the denial of class certification for a class of all
individuals who were eligible for cash assistance for utility bills, but were either denied
assistance or discouraged from applying for assistance.); see also Marcus v. BMW of N.
Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding that classes cannot be too hard to
determine). Similarly, bankruptcy courts around the country conduct valuation analyses for
their cases. The bankruptcy courts must provide creditors and debtors certainty of the value
of assets, liabilities, and equity by evaluating them. Bankruptcy courts typically use three
valuation techniques: discount cash flow (project cash flows (operating profits), select
relevant discount rate, and calculate present value), market multiple approach (use the
market value of companies comparable to the one in bankruptcy), and comparable
transactions (e.g., look at comparable companies’ operating profits, do not look at expected
value, look at recent deals). Ascertainability in eminent domain cases would operate
comparably to the bankruptcy valuation analyses; during an eminent domain dispute over
the price of the land, the trial court would follow similar procedures that bankruptcy courts
apply. That way, the city would be reasonably assured that the economic development
would occur after the taking because the court conducted a proper valuation. See, e.g., In re
DBSD N. Am., Inc., 419 B.R. 179 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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Kelo test is not strict enough. In Kelo, the Court rejected a reasonable
certainty test of whether the expected public benefits would accrue. 262
Instead, the Court decided to simply rule on whether the taking is for a
public purpose, and if so, deemed the taking legal. 263 This test can be
changed so that if there is a taking of private property for economic
development, then the Court would apply a heightened scrutiny test to be
certain, or reasonably assured, that the economic development will in fact
occur. The economic development must be ascertainable to the courts —
the project’s financial benefits must be clear, precise, and objective. Too
often, city officials attach the phrase “economic development” to sports
stadium or arena projects, yet cannot guarantee or provide reasonable
assurances that the cities will reap financial benefits from the project.264
Applying the heightened scrutiny test on a case-by-case basis will give
courts the ability to decide if the taking is truly for the public purpose and,
in doing so, give meaning to “public” again.
Over the years, the meaning of “public” in the phrase “public use”
shifted in eminent domain cases. Initially, public takings often were used
for public schools or other government buildings such as city halls. 265
Then, the United States Government or state or local governments used
eminent domain for common carriers such as railroads and utilities. 266
Next, the government expanded the meaning of “public takings” to
eliminate “blighted areas” as part of urban renewal. 267 Later, the
government used eminent domain to break up monopolies of private
landowners, as seen in Midkiff. 268 Finally, the Court held in Kelo that
public use includes economic development. 269 The Court, therefore,
expanded the meaning of the Takings Clause over the decades — the
Takings Clause’s purpose expanded from public use to public purpose to
economic development. 270 In doing so, the Supreme Court blurred the
lines between private and public. Because the economic development in

262. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 487.
263. See id. at 488.
264. See, e.g., Bryce, supra note 113; Neibauer, supra note 191; Sibilla, supra note 174.
As mentioned briefly before in Section II.B and below in Section III.B, economic studies
show that new stadiums or arenas do not provide the promised economic benefits to the city
or the businesses surrounding the new stadium or arena. Nor are there the projected
increases in jobs or tax collections. See infra notes 281–282.
265. See supra note 35.
266. See supra note 35.
267. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954).
268. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
269. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
270. See supra Section II.A.
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Kelo was not ascertainable, 271 the public purpose of the taking was not
clear. 272 A heightened scrutiny test would require courts to verify that
when the government premises a taking on economic development, the
government must establish that the financial benefits are ascertainable.
The heightened scrutiny test will limit eminent domain misuse by sports
team owners because courts will realize that most, if not all, takings for
sports stadiums or arenas do not fit the heightened scrutiny test for
economic development. Numerous economic studies conclude that new
stadiums or arenas often do not bring the expected economic benefits to the
cities.273 Many cities give sports team owners subsidies or tax breaks to
construct new stadiums or arenas, further compounding the issues of
economic development for stadiums or arenas. 274 As the petitioners in
Kelo stated in their brief, the exceptions to the public purpose definition in
the Takings Clause cannot swallow the rule.275 Post-Kelo, the exceptions
to what constitutes public use include private property.
As more local governments and sports team owners exploit the Takings
Clause, more private landowners have the opportunity to challenge the
taking and seek a limiting or reversal of Kelo.276 Justice Kavanaugh’s 2020
concurrence in Ramos v. Louisiana laid out three factors the Court should
consider when deciding whether to overturn stare decisis. 277 First, the
Court should ask whether the prior decision was not just wrong, but
“egregiously wrong.” 278 Second, the Court should assess if the prior
decision caused “significant negative jurisprudential or real-world
consequences.”279 Third, the Court should examine the reliance interests of

271. Different Justices in Kelo stated that the NLDC did not need to guarantee economic
success. In the majority opinion, Justice Stevens stated the Connecticut judges held that the
City failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that the economic benefits of the plan
would come to pass. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 477.
272. In fact, Pfizer never built the research facility. The taking’s public purpose, the
financial benefits of the facility, never materialized. See McGeehan, supra note 135.
273. See Bull, supra note 132; see also Garofalo & Waldron, supra note 204; Gayer,
Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note 131; Gold, Drukker & Gayer,
Federal Government Spending, supra note 132; Parker, supra note 204; Paulas, supra note
204.
274. See generally Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note
131. The study further shows that since 2000, the federal tax subsidies have cost the federal
government an estimated revenue loss of $3.7 billion. See id. at 16.
275. See Brief of Petitioner, supra note 74, at 29.
276. A good case for certiorari may be one in which the government uses eminent
domain to acquire private land that is not blighted and then transfers that land to a sports
team owner to build a stadium or arena with the justification that the stadium or arena is part
of an economic development.
277. See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414–15 (2020).
278. See id. at 1414.
279. Id. at 1415.
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the parties before overturning the precedent.280 These factors are likely met
here because, as discussed in this Note, Kelo was arguably an egregiously
wrong decision that allowed for subsequent abuses, causing real-world,
harmful consequences for private landowners. Given the widespread
criticism of Kelo and calls for limiting the broad reading of “public use” at
the federal or state levels, sports team owners cannot reasonably rely on it
in the future. Narrowing Kelo’s interpretation of public use, however,
would likely require several years, given that time and money are necessary
to bring a case challenging eminent domain to the Court. Therefore, the
state legislatures should act.
B. State Legislatures Stepping In
Since Kelo, a majority of state governments wrote new legislation
limiting eminent domain in an attempt to prevent businesses and local
governments from misusing eminent domain. 281 However, the new
legislation does not often work as effectively as planned because
developers circumvent legislation. 282 The majority in Kelo stated their
support for legislative deference.283 Justice Thomas, however, recognized
that legislative deference, relied upon by the majority to serve as a
safeguard to potential abuse, has not done enough.284 State legislation is
not applied narrowly and consistently enough to protect residents in many
major cities. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court-supported legislative
deference opens the door for states to write legislation that limits the public
use requirement, and, therefore, curbs the great breadth of eminent domain.
The Court’s decision in Kelo sets the floor for eminent domain

280. See id.
281. See Dana Berliner, Looking Back Ten Years After Kelo, 125 YALE L.J.F. 82, 84–88
(2015).
282. For example, in the Goldstein case, New York State did not enact stronger
provisions, which afforded the Nets and Brooklyn a large degree of latitude to use eminent
domain. See generally Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008). Although both the
House and Senate have introduced bills in attempts to restrict the eminent domain abuse
since Kelo, HR 3058 is the only bill restricting eminent domain takings that the federal
government has actually passed. It constrained eminent domain takings in certain federally
funded programs. See Transportation, Treasury, Housing and Urban Development, The
Judiciary, The District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-115, H.R. 3058, 109th Cong. (2005).
283. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480 (2005).
284. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 516–20 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Whittaker v. County of
Lawrence, the Third Circuit allowed a taking despite the state legislature forbidding
condemnation for economic development. See Whittaker, 437 F. App’x 105 (3d Cir. 2011).
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challenges. 285 States can still apply a higher standard to the Takings
Clause.286
Accordingly, to prevent eminent domain abuse by sports team owners,
legislatures across the country should enact stronger provisions. Some
states enacted stronger state law provisions regarding takings post-Kelo.287
Nonetheless, local governments and sports team owners have maneuvered
around the legislation.288
First, states could pass legislation prohibiting sports team owners and
local governments from using eminent domain to acquire land for sports
stadiums or arenas. Such legislation would be the quickest and most
efficient step to solving the eminent domain exploitation. Stronger state
laws would stop sports team owners from threatening cities and residents
with the use of eminent domain when they are trying to acquire the land
they want for the stadiums. Sports team owners would know they have to
negotiate privately with the citizens.289 Sports team owners would not have

285. See generally Berliner, supra note 281, at 90 (stating that the Kelo decision provides
a federal constitutional floor for the circuit court to review eminent domain takings).
286. See generally Morandi, supra note 26.
287. For example, Florida requires localities to wait ten years before transferring land
taken by eminent domain from one owner to another and does not allow the use of eminent
domain to eliminate “blight” areas. The Florida bill also requires a three-fifths majority in
both legislative houses to grant exceptions to the bill to allow eminent domain for private
use. See FLA. STAT. § 73.013 (2006); Scott J. Kennelly, In Honor of Walter O. Weyrach:
Florida’s Eminent Domain Overhaul: Creating More Problems Than It Solved, 60 Fla. L.
Rev. 471, 475 (2008) (noting that the requirement for three-fifths majority comes from
Florida’s state constitution). Other states have laws that try to protect private property
owners from eminent domain takings. See Morandi, supra note 26. By 2016, 47 states had
enacted some protections against private takings. This still means that the private citizens of
Arkansas, Massachusetts, New York, and Washington, D.C., have only the protection that
Kelo affords. See Berliner, supra note 281, at 88.
288. Economic studies show that stadiums or arenas rarely ever bring in economic
benefits to the area. See Bull, supra note 132; see also Garofalo & Waldron, supra note 204;
Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note 131; Gold, Drukker &
Gayer, Federal Government Spending, supra note 132; Parker, supra note 204; Paulas,
supra note 204. At the same time, attendance across the four major sports leagues has
decreased from 2008 to 2018, with the MLB suffering a 12-year slide. This further proves
that a new sports facility can be a bad investment for a city. See Grant Suneson, These Pro
Sports Teams Are Running Out of Fans, USA TODAY (July 20, 2019, 6:56 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/07/15/nfl-nba-nhl-mlb-sports-teams-runningout-of-fans/39667999/ [https://perma.cc/E54S-JELC]; see also Danielle Allentuck & Kevin
Draper, Baseball Saw a Million More Empty Seats. Does It Matter?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/29/sports/baseball/mlb-attendance.html
[https://perma.cc/VQX2-ZM9R].
289. One issue with eliminating eminent domain as an option is that it might raise
construction costs on stadiums and cause sports owners to ask for subsidies or tax breaks.
While this is hypothetical, sports team owners have been shown to consistently threaten
cities with all sorts of financial demands. Cities should not cave into these demands, as
economic studies have shown that subsidies and tax breaks for stadiums are not good
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the option to threaten eminent domain; this would give residents more
leverage when negotiating with the sports team owners. Stronger state
laws that outlaw eminent domain use for stadiums or arenas would
immediately narrow the reading of Kelo and guarantee that sports team
owners do not take advantage of marginalized communities.
Second, states that permit eminent domain use for sports stadiums and
arenas can still curb abuse by enacting stricter provisions. For example,
states could severely restrict what constitutes economic development and
raise the standard needed to justify a taking for economic development by
applying the heightened scrutiny test mentioned above. If states allow
eminent domain takings for economic development, the financial benefits
must be recognizable and reasonably assured. This heightened standard
would reject many economic development takings as justification for using
eminent domain for sports venues because many sports stadium and arena
constructions fail to bring the assured economic benefits.290
C. State Courts Narrowing Takings Under State Laws
A third solution is that state courts read Kelo narrowly to not allow
economic development to include sports stadiums or arenas. While some
state courts applied a broader reading of Kelo, other state courts narrowly
applied Kelo and set examples that even other states could follow. 291
Currently, a majority of state laws allow courts to narrowly apply eminent
domain usage, especially for business and economic growth.292
These states do not need stronger state laws to prohibit eminent domain
use for sports stadiums and arenas, as they already have state laws that
attempt to restrict takings for economic development.293 Some state courts,
however, in applying even these stronger state laws defer to the local

financial risks and can leave cities with significant debt. See Savare, Middleton Jr. &
Walker, supra note 104; see, e.g., Joyner, supra note 22; supra notes 119, 184 and
accompanying text.
290. See generally Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note
131. In contrast to a research or manufacturing plant that employs thousands of people in the
area on a permanent basis, a sports stadium or arena employs people temporarily for the
games and events taking place there. A football stadium has only eight home games a year
and can rarely be used for other events. Many sports team owners keep a majority of the
profits from those events on top of the subsidies and tax breaks most cities grant the sports
team owners for the construction.
291. See, e.g., Carousel Farms Metro. Dist. v. Woodcrest Homes, Inc., 442 P.3d 402
(Colo. 2019) (finding a district’s condemnation of a parcel of land for a developer was
valid); see also Berliner, supra note 281, at 84–88.
292. See generally Morandi, supra note 26.
293. See id.; see also Berliner, supra note 281, at 84–88.
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governments seeking to use eminent domain.294 For instance, Florida has
some of the strictest state laws concerning the use of eminent domain for
economic expansion; yet, a judge initially approved a taking for an MLS
stadium in the previously mentioned Orlando takings case.295 If the state
court applied the state law as written, the Orlando MLS team would not
have been able to use or threaten the use of eminent domain for the
church’s property. Some newspapers that followed the story stated that if
the church challenged the taking to the appellate level, the church would
have won.296 The issue became moot as the Orlando MLS team relocated
its stadium.297 This case, nevertheless, highlights the fact that state courts
could narrow their reading of Kelo by applying the current stricter state
laws. State courts that do so would substantially limit the number of
eminent domain takings for economic development, not just for sports
venues but for other business projects too.
Some state courts follow this thought process and apply a narrower
holding for eminent domain takings for economic development. Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Iowa, Oklahoma, and Michigan restricted land takings based
on state laws passed after Kelo.298 The courts in these states held that while
the local legislatures enjoy broad rights to take property, the courts have the
authority to check that power.299 In Norwood v. Horney, the Ohio Supreme
Court stated that “[t]he scrutiny by the courts in appropriation cases is
limited in scope, but it clearly remains a critical constitutional
component.”300 The court further explained, “it is for the courts to ensure
that the legislature’s exercise of power is not beyond the scope of its
authority, and that the power is not abused by irregular or oppressive use,
or use in bad faith.” 301 These state courts can effectively restrain
governments and sports team owners from taking land through eminent
domain.

294. See Berliner, supra note 281, at 90–91; see, e.g., City of Austin v. Whittington, 384
S.W.3d 766, 792–93 (Tex. 2012) (allowing a taking despite a jury deciding that the taking
was for private use); State v. Kettleson, 801 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Minn. 2011) (giving
deference to the legislative finding of public use).
295. See Schleub, supra note 5; see also supra note 287 and accompanying text
(discussing Florida’s eminent domain statute).
296. See Somin, Orlando Condemns, supra note 12.
297. See Damron, supra note 4.
298. See Morandi, supra note 26; see also The Oklahoman Editorial Board, Study Shows
Why Eminent Domain Should Be Narrowly Tailored, OKLAHOMAN (Oct. 29, 2014, 12:00
AM),
https://oklahoman.com/article/5361199/study-shows-why-eminent-domain-should-be-narro
wly-tailored [https://perma.cc/3YHX-S949].
299. See Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1138 (Ohio 2006).
300. Id.
301. Id.
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Other state supreme courts have reached similar positions. 302 These
state courts maintain that while some takings are allowed, the current state
laws do not allow certain eminent domain takings, such as those pursuant
to economic development. As discussed previously in Part II, sports
stadiums often fall under the economic development category of taking. If
more state courts limit eminent domain use for economic and business
development, then it would prove more difficult for sports team owners to
use eminent domain.
Eminent domain takings are also challenged in federal court. The
Second, Third, and Fifth circuits each applied Kelo broadly because the
claims brought included challenges based on the federal Constitution and
state laws.303 In the federal claims, the circuit courts applied the Supreme
Court’s holding from Kelo. The courts of appeals, however, did not
directly rule on the state law claims. Instead, they remanded the cases back
to the district courts to rule on the state law claims. 304 To receive the

302. See, e.g., Reading Area Water Auth. v. Schuylkill River Greenway Ass’n, 100 A.3d
572, 583–84 (Pa. 2014) (concluding that Pennsylvania state laws enacted after Kelo restrict
eminent domain use for economic development and the drainage easement was not for
public use and could not be allowed); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Muskogee Cnty. v. Lowery,
136 P.3d 639, 653 (Okla. 2006) (rejecting a taking of a landowner’s private property for the
private benefit to a private party); Cnty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 782–83
(Mich. 2004) (holding that in order for a taking to be for the public use under the Michigan
Constitution, it must be for public necessity, remain subject to public oversight, or there
must be an independent public need).
303. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 437 F. App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2011);
Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 58 (2d Cir. 2008); Western Seafood Co. v. United States,
202 F. App’x 670, 675 (5th Cir. 2006).
304. The Second Circuit held:
Few powers of government have as immediate and intrusive an impact on the
lives of citizens as the power of eminent domain . . . . But federal judges may not
intervene in such matters simply on the basis of our sympathies. Just as eminent
domain has its costs, it has its benefits, and in all but the most extreme cases,
Supreme Court precedent requires us to leave questions of how to balance the two
to the elected representatives of government, notwithstanding the hardships felt by
those whose property is slated for condemnation.
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 52. The Third Circuit held:
Rather than doing this, we will take Kelo at its face value, and interpret it as
providing a federal constitutional floor for the definition of a public use that
allows states to build upon this floor should they choose to do so. Although we
need not resolve the question of whether the conduct in this case violated
Pennsylvania’s state laws or constitution, we do hold that such conduct does not
violate the Federal Constitution and we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal
of the Property Owners’ Fifth Amendment takings claim.
Whittaker, 437 F. App’x at 108.

190

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLVIII

desired outcome of limiting eminent domain in the federal courts, state
legislatures need to establish precedent like those in Ohio, Pennsylvania, or
Oklahoma and apply a more stringent test for economic development
takings.
D. Eminent Domain and Relocation Contractual Provisions
Cities and local governments have a fourth option to curb eminent
domain overreach. Cities can negotiate with sports team owners to add
contractual provisions that disallow relocation and the use of eminent
domain for future sports stadiums or arenas. Just as the Los Angeles
Clippers’s contract included the ability to use eminent domain for its future
arena, the City of Los Angeles could have done the reverse and included a
provision that prohibits the use of eminent domain.305 The restriction of
relocation would deter sports team owners from lobbying local
governments for new stadiums and threatening to leave the city unless it
built them a new sports facility. The prohibition on using eminent domain
would preclude sports team owners from threatening cities or citizens to
take land through these means. Although the contract solution would be
the quickest to implement going forward because it is a matter of contract
law, such an idea would be difficult to apply retroactively to previous
eminent domain takings. But, when the current contracts are up, cities can
look into adding these provisions and restricting the sports team owners’
leverage over cities and their local governments.
E. The Public Purpose Doctrine
The fifth and final solution that cities and local governments could
explore is the Public Purpose Doctrine. The Public Purpose Doctrine is a
judicially imposed constitutional limit on how local, state, and federal
governments can spend public funds for a public purpose.306 If a private
corporation attempts to build a new facility, the corporation would likely
argue it is for the public purpose of that location. Many private-sector
corporations depend on obtaining favorable subsidies or tax breaks. 307
These subsidies, however, have risen to substantial levels, causing state and

305. See Perfett, supra note 215.
306. See Dale F. Rubin, The Public Pays, the Corporation Profits: The Emasculation of
the Public Purpose Doctrine and a Not-for-Profit Solution, 28 U. RICH. L. REV. 1311, 1312
(1994).
307. See id.; see also Brian Libgober, The Death of Public Purpose (and How to Prevent
It) (John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Discussion
Paper No. 63, 2016); Robert Reich, How Corporate Welfare Hurts You, AM. PROSPECT (July
23,
2019),
https://prospect.org/economy/corporate-welfare-hurts/
[https://perma.cc/4UYN-8JGR].
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local debt to increase exponentially.308 The Public Purpose Doctrine, as
invoked through the courts, ensures that private corporation improvements
benefit the public and serve the public purpose of the area.
Courts can apply the Public Purpose Doctrine with a balancing test.
Courts must consider the costs and benefits; if the benefits outweigh the
costs, courts can allow the proposed economic development plan. The
balancing test will provide that before the proposal can be approved, the
local government must identify or receive the financial benefits from the
economic development plan. The application of the Public Purpose
Doctrine balancing test could be relevant to a review of proposals for sports
stadiums and arenas if they receive public subsidies and tax breaks. The
test allows courts another opportunity to scrutinize eminent domain takings
for sports stadiums and arenas and see if they are truly for a public purpose.
As economic studies show, constructing a new stadium or arena rarely
brings financial benefits to the city.309
In a situation where a sports team owner and a local government attempt
to use eminent domain to acquire land for a sports stadium or arena, the
landowners can challenge this taking under the Public Purpose Doctrine if
the city decides to give the sports team owners subsidies or tax breaks. To
permit this taking and construction, the courts must require that the plan’s
primary benefit is for the public, that the public benefit is not incidental,
and that the net gain is ascertainable. Otherwise, without this judicial
intervention, the residents lose their property and incur higher taxes to
offset the subsidies and tax breaks. The Public Purpose Doctrine gives
citizens another chance to fight the taking and provides an opportunity for
the public to challenge new stadiums or arenas that receive hundreds of
millions of dollars from cities through subsidies or tax breaks.
Nevertheless, sports team owners and local governments might avoid the
Public Purpose Doctrine because of how broadly the courts construe
“public purpose.” Over the years, the definition of “public purpose” has
become fairly fluid. As discussed above, courts have held that economic
improvement is a constitutionally supported public purpose, so many states
accept economic development for blighted areas. 310 Additionally, many
courts defer to the legislative branch because the legislature represents the
308. See Libgober, supra note 307, at 4–5. By 2013, state and local government debts
rose to $3 trillion. See Penelope Lemov, Do the States Have a Debt Problem?, GOVERNING
(May
30,
2013,
5:00
PM),
https://www.governing.com/columns/public-finance/col-states-rising-debt-problem.html
[https://perma.cc/V259-2TBP].
309. See generally Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note
131.
310. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008); see also Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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public. 311 For the Public Purpose Doctrine to prevent eminent domain
abuse for publicly subsidized sports stadiums and arenas, courts must read
“public purpose” narrowly and utilize the applicable balancing test.312
IV. THE SOLUTIONS THAT CAN WORK
There are two solutions that have the best chance of being successful.
The most direct way to prevent sports team owners from using eminent
domain for sports stadiums and arenas requires the Supreme Court to take
up an eminent domain case, reverse Kelo’s holding on the public use
clause, and conclude that economic development does not constitute public
use and is not an appropriate application of eminent domain. If the
Supreme Court changes the Kelo holding, this decision would impact all 50
states and be applied immediately post-ruling. The new ruling would
automatically set a higher bar that city and local governments must meet
before using eminent domain. More importantly, a narrower holding of the
public use clause in Kelo would make sports team owners accountable for
the land they want to acquire for their sports stadiums or arenas. Sports
team owners know that if they cannot use eminent domain for their sports
stadiums or arenas, the free market will force them into more balanced
negotiations for land acquisitions. A Supreme Court ruling that narrows
Kelo and its scope of the public use clause would apply to every state. This
would be the most efficient way to counteract the prevalent use of eminent
domain for such purposes.
There is a deterrent factor with any Supreme Court decision — the
length of time. The Supreme Court would have to take up a case that a
previous appellate court heard either at the state or federal court level. A
plaintiff would have to argue his or her case all the way to the Supreme
Court, which requires money, time, and dedication. The case must be one
the plaintiff believes is worth this tremendous effort. The Supreme Court
could have reviewed an eminent domain case regarding their holding in
Kelo in 2014 with Goldstein v. Pataki, but the Court denied certiorari.313
In the past, some members of the Supreme Court have stated they would
like to reexamine Kelo in the future.314 After the Barclays Center case,

311. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480 (reasoning that the courts have a longstanding policy of
deference to legislative judgments in determining public purpose).
312. See Libgober, supra note 307.
313. See Goldstein, 554 U.S. 930.
314. Kelo remains one of the least popular opinions, especially among some Justices.
Justice Antonin Scalia compared the Kelo decision to two other cases — Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) — as decisions that
were “mistakes of political judgment.” He said that “Kelo will not survive.” Colin Young,
Could the Supreme Court Overturn the Kelo Decision?, DAY (June 23, 2015, 10:36 PM),
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landowners sought certiorari — a rare occasion for a public taking,
especially for a taking regarding a sports stadium. The Supreme Court
denied certiorari, but Justice Alito wrote a statement on the denial of
certiorari.315 One can speculate that Justice Alito realizes he might now
have the majority needed to reverse Kelo. The fact that Justice Alito would
have granted certiorari likely shows he believed it was time for the Court to
reexamine Kelo’s holding. 316 Since Kelo, the Court’s conservative
majority has grown;317 of the seven appointments since Kelo, five Justices
may be labeled as “conservative.” 318 The two Justices who wrote the
majority and concurring opinions in Kelo, Justices Anthony Kennedy and
Stevens, have left the Court. Both Justices were replaced by more
conservative-leaning Justices that may vote in a manner more aligned with
Justices Thomas’s and O’Connor’s Kelo dissents. 319 Therefore, if and
when the Supreme Court revisits Kelo, one can predict it will apply a
stricter reading of the Takings Clause.
While the landowners wait for the Supreme Court to take up the
appropriate case, there is another answer that would be efficient in curbing
eminent domain abuse. The state legislatures could step in and pass laws
that outlaw the use of eminent domain for economic development, in
particular sports stadiums and arenas. Most states already have certain
laws that make it difficult to use eminent domain for economic

https://www.theday.com/article/20150622/NWS01/150629796
[https://perma.cc/TJ9G-Q9NU]; see also Somin, The Case Against the Kelo Decision, supra
note 16. While Justice Scalia is no longer on the bench, his replacement, Justice Neil
Gorsuch, may rule in a similar manner as he would have. See Adam Feldman, Empirical
SCOTUS: How Gorsuch’s First Year Compares, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 11, 2018, 12:00 PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/04/empirical-scotus-how-gorsuchs-first-year-compares/
[https://perma.cc/UR7Z-EH8X].
315. See Goldstein, 554 U.S. 930.
316. See id.; see also Patricia Salkin, SCOTUS Denies Cert in Goldstein v. Pataki —
Atlantic Yards Eminent Domain Case, LAW LAND (June 23, 2008),
https://lawoftheland.wordpress.com/2008/06/23/scouts-denies-cert-in-goldstein-v-pataki-%
E2%80%93-atlantic-yards-eminent-domain-case/ [https://perma.cc/Y7ZN-SZ7K].
317. See
Justices
1789
to
Present,
SUP.
CT.
U.S.,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx
[https://perma.cc/ERT7-3CFG]
(last visited Nov. 24, 2020); see also The Political Leanings of the Supreme Court Justices,
AXIOS
(June
1,
2019),
https://www.axios.com/supreme-court-justices-ideology-52ed3cad-fcff-4467-a336-8bec2e6
e36d4.html [https://perma.cc/Y38U-H4RT].
318. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 317; see also Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux,
Is the Supreme Court Heading for a Conservative Revolution?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct. 7,
2019,
6:00
AM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/is-the-supreme-court-heading-for-a-conservative-revolut
ion/ [https://perma.cc/RL2C-8UKV].
319. See The Political Leanings of the Supreme Court Justices, supra note 317; see also
Thomson-DeVeaux, supra note 318.
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development, but by amending these laws, states can further protect their
citizens from eminent domain abuse.
There are, however, two problems with this response — it requires each
state to either amend its laws or create new ones. This takes time,
especially as there is occasionally political gridlock in state and local
governments. 320 Because this response requires each state to prohibit
eminent domain use for sports stadiums and arenas, some states might be
slow to act. Sports team owners would continue to take advantage of
eminent domain until the respective state legislature prevents it.321
As to other solutions offered in Part III, they are not as feasible as the
two best solutions. Courts might have difficulty applying the Public
Purpose Doctrine and the ascertainability test. These concepts might be too
much of a stretch for the courts to accept, as some courts do not even
accept ascertainability for class actions.322 Such a scheme would be the
hardest to apply.
The proposed solution of cities and local governments, including a
contractual clause forbidding eminent domain, is only applicable to the city
and the sports team owner that negotiated the contract. The contractual
clause would not prohibit other sports team owners from utilizing eminent
domain in other cities when the team finds it appropriate. The contractual
clause would not alleviate the problem unless every city and local
government insists on using it.323 This is unlikely even if a majority of
sports team owners might approve of it.
The third possibility of state courts narrowing takings under state laws is
direct but only works if a majority of state courts apply it. Presently, some
state courts do not narrow takings under state laws, which consequently
opens those states to future abuse by sports team owners. To be effective,
the state court solution would also require multiple lawsuits across the

320. See, e.g., Francine Kiefer, Gridlock in States: Why They’re Mimicking D.C.,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(Apr.
8,
2016),
https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2016/0408/Gridlock-in-states-why-they-re-mimic
king-D.C [https://perma.cc/KJ6K-QRFM].
321. At the start of writing this Note, the COVID-19 pandemic had not yet affected the
United States. The obvious economic repercussions from the pandemic will alter how some
sports team owners operate in the near future because fans are prevented from or limited in
attending sporting events, thus significantly curtailing revenue. When fans eventually return
to attending games, sports team owners will likely look to build and update their stadiums.
322. See Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that by
any reasonable statutory construction, ascertainability is not included in F.R.C.P. Rule 23).
323. The contractual clause only binds the two parties who negotiated it. In cases of cities
and sports team owners inserting the clause in their contracts, it would only bind those cities
and sports team owners. It would not bind any other cities, local governments, or sports
team owners. Therefore, other cities and local governments would be required to separately
negotiate with their respective sports team owners.
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nation to challenge government use of eminent domain for stadium or arena
development. This is also unlikely to happen in the near future — this type
of response could take years, significant financial resources, and much
legal action by various parties. Until all 50 states’ courts take up eminent
domain cases, residents of states without challenges will be unprotected.
After reviewing the pros and cons of each possible solution to the
overuse of eminent domain for sports stadiums and arenas, this Note
advocates for the Supreme Court to reverse Kelo and for the state and
federal legislatures to create or amend laws that prohibit the practice. The
Supreme Court reversal would take time and money, and the right case to
appeal. Until that happens, this Note recommends that the state and federal
legislatures restrict the use of eminent domain to build sports stadiums or
arenas. Political gridlock and lobbying by sports team owners could pose
obstacles that might prevent the legislatures from passing the laws needed
to protect people from the ongoing eminent domain misuse.324 However,
the hope is that the legislatures can overcome these hurdles to protect their
constituents from overly opportunistic sports team owners.
CONCLUSION
Plutocratic sports team owners are taking advantage of private
landowners so that the owners can build new sports stadiums that are worth
hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars. Sports team owners do this
at the expense of the public. These new sports stadiums and arenas,
however, are not for public use but serve private interests. Local
community members cannot use the stadiums or arenas without first buying
the privilege to use them via tickets. Sports team owners attach the words
“economic development” as a pretext to build the stadium, thereby making
it easier to circumvent an eminent domain challenge in court. Economic
studies, however, consistently demonstrate that new stadiums or arenas do
not bring the promised financial benefits to cities.325 In fact, because of

324. See Adie Tomer & Lara Fishbane, Political Gridlock Blocks Infrastructure Progress
and
Costs
Our
Economy,
BROOKINGS
(Apr.
25,
2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/the-avenue/2019/04/25/political-gridlock-blocks-infrastruct
ure-progress-and-costs-our-economy/ [https://perma.cc/BTV4-4KXZ].
325. See generally Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note
131; see also Bryce, supra note 113; Neibauer, supra note 191; Sibilla, supra note 174. As
mentioned briefly in Sections II.B and III.B, economic studies show that new stadiums or
arenas do not provide the promised economic benefits to the city or the businesses
surrounding the new stadium or arena. Nor are there the projected increases in jobs or tax
collections. See Gayer, Drukker & Gold, Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds, supra note 131.
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additional subsidies or tax breaks that cities give the sports team owners,
cities lose millions of dollars to build new stadiums or arenas.326
The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari on a challenge to an eminent
domain taking for a sports stadium would be the most straightforward way
for the Court to rule that courts have read the Takings Clause too broadly.
The recent change in the makeup of the Supreme Court opens the door to
reexamining Kelo.327 Although the Court cannot retroactively give back
the land taken from individuals impacted by the Kelo decision, the Court
can guarantee this does not happen as often in the future.
There are times when eminent domain is appropriate or even required
for government use. Building a new privately owned sports stadium on
land taken by eminent domain from a private entity is not one of them.
When a government takes land from private individuals, it should give the
public the legal right to use that property after the taking or at least be
certain the public will benefit from the taking. The government should not
transfer the land to another private entity that will put it to private use
unless the government is reasonably assured that the economic
development will materialize. Narrowing the Takings Clause in the Fifth
Amendment will require the government to utilize eminent domain
sparingly and with appropriate rationale, thus preventing individuals with
significant influence and power, such as sports team owners, from taking
advantage of those residents who are less fortunate. It will level the
playing field, which is what sports team owners around the country should
want, as it is the sporting thing to do.

326. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the issue that stadiums’ debts cost cities.
Cities give hundreds of millions of dollars to construct stadiums thinking they will bring in
new revenue. During the pandemic, the country halted sporting events; none of the leagues
or teams brought in revenue and people employed by the teams were furloughed. See
Patrick Murray, How Could The Golden State Warriors’ Finances Be Impacted If the NBA
Season
Is
Canceled?,
FORBES
(Apr.
6,
2020,
8:30
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickmurray/2020/04/06/how-could-the-golden-state-warrior
s-finances-be-impacted-if-the-nba-season-is-canceled/#3ebb370d2ff8
[https://perma.cc/U236-XEKN]. Meanwhile, the cities that gave the sports team owners
subsidies or tax breaks still had to pay off these debts during the pandemic. Cities that were
cash strapped because of the pandemic suffered even more. See Adam Harris, The Other
Way the Coronavirus Will Ravage Our Cities, ATLANTIC (Apr. 1, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/04/coronavirus-cities-bankruptcy/609169
/ [https://perma.cc/NXX2-PFTY]. Some cities, like St. Louis, are still paying stadium debts
even after the team left the City years ago. See Robin Respaut, With NFL Rams Gone, St.
Louis Still Stuck with Stadium Debt, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2016, 8:29 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sports-nfl-stadiums-insight/with-nfl-rams-gone-st-louis-s
till-stuck-with-stadium-debt-idUSKCN0VC0EP [https://perma.cc/6FH9-62UP].
327. See Ilya Somin, Prospects for the Future of Kelo, Property Rights, and Public Use,
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